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I.

INTRODUCTION

The drastic increase in international investments by the end of the 1990s is associated
with an increase in the number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).1 The international
treaty community now is loaded with almost 3,000 BITs.2 Most of these BITs require the
application of international investment law. One component of these BITs is the InvestorState Dispute Settlement (ISDS) clause, whereby the substantive level of protection for
investors becomes enforceable. Such clauses provide for the method of settlement of the
dispute arising between an investor and its host state through arbitration.3 For instance,
the US Model BIT,4 the Swiss BITs,5 the Energy Charter Treaty “ECT”,6 and the North
American Free Trade Agreement “NAFTA”7 contain an arbitration clause for the
mechanism of dispute settlement.
There is no definitive proof to show that the world of investment treaties had led to the
economic development of developing countries.8 Contrarily, it has brought economic
prosperity to arbitrators, academic aspirants, and law firms.9 Further, it has increased the
anxiety of states because of the recurrent recourse to arbitration by foreign investors even
during times of economic crises of developing states; it has hindered policies that could
have been adopted to avoid problematic situations.10 The legitimacy crisis that arises with
the system is two fold. First, the system is criticized for allowing two unequal reciprocals,
1

Christoph H. Schreuer, The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System, in The International Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 15, 20, in Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds.(2007)
[hereinafter, Shreuer The Dynamic]; See also, M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
FORIEGN INVESTMENT, (Cambridge 2), at 204-212(2004) [hereinafter, M.Sornarajah, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW].
2
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investment Dispute Navigator, the
statistics available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/. [hereinafter UNCTAD].
3
See generally, Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW,
Oxford University Press (2007) [hereinafter Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION].
4
U.S.
Model
Bilateral
Investment
Treaty
of
2012,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.
5
See, e.g. Switzerland-China BIT, art. 11, ¶ 2, Jan. 27 (2009), See also, Switzerland-Malaysia BIT, art. 9,
¶. 2, (1978).
6
The Energy Charter Treaty, art.26, ¶2 (c) and ¶4, (1994) [hereinafter ECT].
7
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.A.-Canada-Mexico, art.1120, (1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
8
M.Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
9
Id.
10
Id.

the private investors and the sovereign states, to adjudicate before a group of private
arbitrators who are perceived to decide disputes in accordance with their ideological
preferences. Thus, the system is perceived as affecting the economic stability of states
and exposes them to a multitude of claims that arise from their right to exercise their
regulatory power in periods of economic and political crisis. Second, the criticism
concerns the lack of democracy in the law that was created by ad hoc tribunals.
Investment arbitrators should not have the mandate to make profound amendments they
pursue on the grounds of the existing vague provisions in the bilateral and multilateral
investment treaties. These adjudicators are not accountable to do so. The grounds for
their decisions regarding vague provisions together with the lack of an appellate body
raise many concerns about their independence and impartiality.
In that sense, the ISDS system creates a one-sided system of adjudication that empowers
investors to bring claims against host states and bestows power to private adjudicators
who decide disputes in an unfair manner affecting the economic stability of host states.
Such a partial and dependent system calls for serious reform proposals in order to
diminish such partiality.
Today, arbitration under the ICSID Convention11 is the most frequently used mechanism
for settling investment disputes.12 The ICSID Convention was adopted in 1965 which
allowed the World Bank to establish the International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes.13
The ICSID Convention does not entail rules or impose any level of substantial protection
to investors’ rights, but rather it regulates the procedural mechanism for resolving

11

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar.
18, (1965), entered into force Oct. 14 (1966), [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
12
Id, ICSID Convention.
13
UNCTAD, supra note 2,UNCTAD/WIR/2015, June 25 (2015); See also Meg Kinnear &Frauke Nitschke,
2 Disqualification of Arbitrators under the ICSID Convention and Rules, in CHALLENGES AND
RECUSALS OF JUDGES AND ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
34, 34 (2015), available at http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/books/b9789004302129_004.
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investment disputes that arise between investors of member states and their host states.14
Thus, ICSID allows investors to bring claims against their host states, provided that the
investor’s home state and the host state are both members of the Convention.15 This
means that the ICSID Convention assists investors in evading the potentially perceived
bias of the domestic courts of the host states and in avoiding having to resort to the
diplomatic protection provided by their home states. By substituting “gunboat
diplomacy,” which was formerly used to resolve investment disputes, and by assessing
claims in a neutral manner, arbitration under the ICSID Convention has de-politicized
investor-state disputes and enhanced the rule of law.16
The ICSID Convention focuses on empowering the procedural mechanism of dispute
settlement, rather than providing any substantive protection. This means that it aims at
providing substantive outcomes through fair and neutral procedural settings.17 In this, it is
purported to ensure that such neutral proceedings are better able to guarantee that
decisions are not rendered in an unpredictable environment. In the complex environment
of investment disputes, where in decisions rendered in investor-state disputes are most
probably not satisfying to all parties concerned, the parties should have faith and trust in
the fairness of the mechanism itself. Such acceptance and compliance of unfavorable
awards is illustrated by the lack of any doubts about the impartiality and fairness of the
procedures.18 Therefore, the legitimacy of the system lies in the shared belief in the
procedural integrity of the award despite the outcome of the award.19

14

See generally, Christoph Schreuer, Loretta Malintoppi, August Reinisch A, and Anthony Sinclair, THE
ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, (2009) [hereinafter
Schreuer et al., COMMENTARY]; See also, Shreuer, The Dynamic, supra note 1, at 16.
15
Id.
16
David W. Rivkin, The Impact of International Arbitration on the Rule of Law, 29 Arb. Int’l.327, 341
(2013).
17
See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W. Gehring, & Andrew Newcombe, The Institutionalization
of Investment Arbitration and Sustainable Development, in Sustainable Development in World Investment
Law 615, 618 (2011).
18
Lars Markert, Challenging Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration: The Challenging Search for Relevant
Standards and Ethical Guidelines, 3 Contemp. Asia Arb. J. 237-243 (2010).
19
David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on Legitimacy, 513
Suffolk Transnat’l. L.J., 514 (2008) [hereinafter Caron, Investor State Arbitration].
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It is undoubted that such procedural integrity and fairness mainly depends on the decision
makers. Therefore, the independence and impartiality of arbitrators is imperative and
mutual within all the arbitration systems.20 Its significance is further highlighted by both
the lack of a rule of precedent and a mechanism for appeal in arbitration. The power
endowed to arbitrators in deciding arbitration cases is only acceptable when it is
objectively-wielded and follows the rules of law in a rational way.21 This is so even with
regard to investment arbitration, as it concerns significant public interests that are often at
stake.22 Van Harten highlights this idea in one of his writings;23 he argues that should
anyone affirm that investment arbitration guarantees neutral, fair, unbiased, and hence a
superior scheme of decision-making, the system will be properly apprehended to reflect a
high standard of independence and impartiality.24 Whether investment arbitration under
the ICSID Convention satisfies this expectation or not is controversial. There has been a
tremendous increase in the number of disqualification requests submitted to the Centre
against ICSID arbitrators;25 accordingly, many scholars have started to shed light on this
issue in the past few years.
The disqualification requests of arbitrators under the ICSID Convention have come under
scrutiny in order to bring transparency to the standard of independence and impartiality
set forth in the ICSID Arbitration Rules.26 This standard and its threshold have been
compared to equivalent standards applied in other mechanisms of adjudication,
particularly commercial arbitration and public international law adjudication, aiming at

20

Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of International Arbitrators, in The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to
International Arbitration 621, 630, Lawrence W. Newman &Richard D. Hill eds., 2d ed. (2008) [hereinafter
Rogers, The Ethics of International Arbitrators].
21

Gus Van Harten, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 627, 627, 631, 637 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010)
[hereinafter Van Harten, Procedural Fairness].
22
See Rogers, The Ethics of International Arbitrators, supra note 17, at 648–649.
23
Van Harten, Procedural Fairness, supra note 18.
24
Id.
25
ICSID Convention, supra note 8, art. 57; See also infra chapter two.
26
James D. Fry & Juan Ignacio Stampalija, Forged Independence and Impartiality: Conflicts of Interest of
International Arbitrators in Investment Disputes, 30 Arb. Int’l.189, 210–246 (2014).
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reaching a decent standard for the independence and impartiality of ICSID arbitrators.27
Many empirical analyses have been carried out for determining whether ICSID
arbitrators are biased or not.28 These analyses are executed through measuring the effect
of the extra-legal factors on the awards rendered by ICSID Arbitrators.29 Many scholars
have varying conclusions and solutions for the problems identified. Some scholars
propose that the problem should be resolved via new standards of independence and
impartiality under the current institutional framework.30 Another group of scholars detect
a systematic bias in the whole system as the main issue that needs vital reform.31A further
group of scholars has determined that the systematic bias existing in the core of the
current system cannot be evaded by amending the applicable safeguards; it requires the
abolishment of the whole system and the establishment of a permanent international
investment court.32
This paper deals with the critiques directed towards the current ISDS specifically those
concerning the political and procedural critiques of the Investment Treaty Arbitration
system. In examining the political critiques, this paper scrutinizes the lack of
independence in the system in its entirety because it empowers private investors to bring
claims against host states and thus affecting the state regulatory powers concerning its
public interests. The system creates a distinctive relationship between sovereign states
and private individuals in which there is no balance between the two parties. Moreover, it
jeopardizes a state’s sovereignty by subjecting the investor-state disputes to private
27

Audley Sheppard, Arbitrator Independence in ICSID Arbitration, in International Investment Law for the
21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer 131, 133–136 (2009) ]hereinafter, Sheppard,
Arbitrator Independence[.
28
Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behavior in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment
Treaty
Arbitration,
50
Osgoode
Hall
L.J.
211
(2012),
available
at
SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2149256. [hereinafter Van Harten, Asymmetrical Adjudication (2012)].
29
Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment
Arbitrators, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 47 (2010) [hereinafter, Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment]; See also, Susan
D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C.l. Rev. 1 (2007).
30
G.J. Horvath & R. Berzero, Arbitrator and Counsel: the Double-Hat Dilemma, 10 Transnat’l. Disp.
Mgmt. (2013) ]hereinafter Horvath&Berzero[; See also, Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration, at 155-159
(2013) [hereinafter Jan Paulsson, The Idea].
31
Stavros Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A New Approach to
Arbitral Decision Making, 4 J. Int’l.Disp. Settlement 553, 585 (2013) [hereinafterBrekoulakis, Systemic
Bias].
32
Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 3.
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adjudicators who are perceived to be biased toward certain classes of investors.
Afterwards, it deals with the problem of the arbitrators’ bias in investment treaty
arbitration when there is no obvious evidence of bias according to the applicable rules of
arbitration. It argues that there is a perceived bias in the arbitrators’ behavior in
international investment arbitration. Such perceived bias is due to the influence of
different ideologies and policy preferences of arbitrators on their decision-making.
Furthermore, the existence of party appointment mechanism increases the critiques
toward the independence and impartiality of the system in its entirety. Since arbitrators
lack secure tenure, the existence of a party appointment mechanism becomes a fertile
ground for personal interests and unleashes the problem of the moral hazard of
arbitrators. It finally analyzes the proposal for establishing a permanent multilateral
investment court and argues that despite the possibility of resolving the critiques
addressed to the party appointment mechanism, such a proposal does not guarantee an
effective resolution of the political problems of the system and the moral hazard of
arbitrators. Concluding that, such a proposal collects the worst features of the current
ISDS system within one authoritative body and diminishes any hope for a fair and neutral
adjudication.
Chapter two discusses the political criticism of the ISDS system represented in the
empowerment of private investors to bring sovereign states before private adjudication
bodies. Further, it analyzes the ideological bias of an arbitrator towards a certain party in
investment arbitration. It focuses on the problems concerning the arbitrators’ perceptions.
Following, it discusses the procedural problems of the ITA system represented in the
existence of the party appointment mechanism and analyzes the problem of the moral
hazard of arbitrators.
Chapter three sets out the relevant case law in which we can detect the effect of ideology
on the final decision can be detected. In this, it focuses on one controversial issue in
investment arbitration; that is the scope of application of the Most Favored Nation clause
(MFN) and whether it encompasses dispute resolution provisions or not, and scrutinizes
how the existence of contested issues can reveal the different interpretations of arbitrators
6

in the same issue. It emphasizes two decisions rendered in two different cases that had
similar claims and arguments but with different outcomes; these cases are Siemens v.
Argentina and Daimler v. Argentina.
Chapter four scrutinizes the recent reform proposal dealing with the criticism of the
illegitimacy of the ITA. In this, it examines the proposal of creating an Investment Court
System (ICS) provided in the draft texts of the TTIP and the proposal for establishing a
permanent Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) to replace the current ISDS system.
Finally, it assesses these proposals in light of the current criticism of the present system
and emphasizes the court’s complete inefficiency in curbing the current problems of the
ISDS system.

7

II.

CRITIQUES OF INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION

Many critiques address the structural and procedural flaws of the ITA system.33
Since the system is of a public law nature, it must encompass the four main
requirements for any public law adjudication system. These are accountability,
coherence, transparency and openness, and independence.34 Critiques demonstrate
that the current ITA system has failed to meet any of these requirements. In brief,
accountability, stricto sensu, refers to the accountability of the adjudicator in
interpreting public law and the existence of higher appeal mechanism for matters
of legal interpretations. Despite the fact that the ITA system allows the review of
the arbitral awards, this review is minimal and limited in nature. To illustrate, the
ICSID Convention provides for annulment procedures pursuant to Article 52.35
These annulment procedures are held through constituting an annulment
committee that is entitled to examine the challenges brought against the award
from the losing party. However, this annulment mechanism is inefficient because
the grounds for annulment are very limited and do not empower the annulment
committee to review errors in interpretation of laws by arbitrators.36 This
demonstrates the power given to private adjudicators to interpret and review
questions of public law without the existence of proper supervision over their

33

Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 3; Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics
of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 Santa Clara Int'l L. Rev, (2013), Penn State Law Research
Paper No. 52-2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2347843 ]hereinafter, Rogers, The
Politics[.
34
Id.
35
Article (52) provides that: (“stating that, Either party may request annulment of the award by an
application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that
the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that
there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure
from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is
based…”).
36
Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 3.

decisions. This absence of adequate supervision gives arbitrators free discretion in
interpreting public law, which is perceived an lacking accountability.37

With regard to openness, there are two requirements that have to be fulfilled.
These are the transparency of the decisions and its relevant documents to the
public. This is important because it opens the door for public scrutiny and thus
public issues not being decided in the dark. Public scrutiny is significant because
the arbitrator would know that her/his decision is subject to review and possible
criticism by the public and would attempt to avoid undermining the credibility of
the entire system.38 Thus, such a matter underpins the importance of
independence and the accountability of adjudicators. Under the current ITA
system, openness is decided on a case-by-case basis because it depends on the
state party to the dispute.

Another critique of the ITA system is the lack of the standard of coherence.39 This
is due to the non-existence of a hierarchal system of appellate review that ensures
a predictable manner in interpreting the rules of the law in a unified way in cases
of inconsistent decisions concerning the same subject matter.40 The absence of
coherence is problematic because the governmental decision-making process
relies, to a certain extent, on the ability of legislatures to recognize the boundaries
of sovereign power and its consequences.41 Consequently, it is difficult for
governmental decision-makers to foresee the consequences and impacts of their
policies. That is why governments find it difficult to endure the special burden of
the lack of coherence in the ITA regime.42

37

Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 107-158.
Id, at 159-162.
39
Id, at 164.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See supra note 11.
38
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Finally, the ITA system fails to maintain the independence requirement.43 This is
due to the existence of private law adjudicators that are entitled to decide on
private law matters concerning private property between foreign investors and the
sovereignty of host states.44
Under investment treaties, foreign investors enjoy a high level of protection
against their host states’ regulatory measures that might affect their investments.45
This protection is demonstrated in the substantive guarantees provided in
investment treaties; such guarantees include the prohibition of expropriation, Fair
and Equitable Treatment (FET), and non-discrimination.46 The obvious purpose is
to protect foreign investments by shielding them from any political risks in their
host states and thus, increasing the flow of foreign direct investments.47 One
important aspect of investment treaties is the settlement of disputes through
arbitration, known as the dispute settlement clause. Investment arbitration
operates beyond the domestic application of the host states’ applicable laws and
enables foreign investors to bring claims before international tribunals and obtain
favorable financial adjudications against their host states.48
Furthermore, the ITA system faces many procedural criticisms. Critics identify
investment arbitration tribunals as “secret courts”49 that are constituted of biased

43

Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 170.
See Benedict Kingsbury, Stephan W. Schill, Public Law concepts to Balance Investor’s Rights with
State Regulatory Actions in the public Interest –The Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, Oxford Univ. Press, at 75-104 (2010)
]hereinafter, Kingsbury&Schill Public Law Concepts[; See also Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, in M. Waibel et al (eds.) THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, Kluwer Law Intl’ (2010).
45
See generally, M. Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
46
Rudolf Dolzer and Christopher Schreuer, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW,
2nd ed., (2012) ]hereinafter, Shreuer&Dolzer, PRINCIPLES[.
47
Id; See also Sornarajah, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
48
Shreuer&Dolzer, PRINCIPLES, supra note 43.
49
Anthony De Palma, "Nafta’s Powerful Little Secret, Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far,
Critics Say", NY Times, 11 March (2001).
44
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arbitrators.50 The arbitration regime is perceived to be rigged in favor of investors
rather than being neutral and fair.51 Unlike the court system, where judges are
designated based on specific criteria, in investment arbitration the tribunal usually
consists of three arbitrators; each disputing party appoints one arbitrator, who is
deemed neutral and totally independent; the president of the tribunal is appointed
either by the mutual agreement of both parties or by the arbitral institution.52
Despite the fact that the appointed arbitrators must be independent and impartial
toward both parties, the discretionary power of the parties in appointing them
creates incentives for arbitrators to act favorably to their appointing parties aiming
at future appointments. Having said that, one might think that the president of the
tribunal, being appointed by the two arbitrators and not by the parties, is
independent and not swayed toward any party; however, this is not the case here
either. The presiding arbitrator might be biased toward a certain party due to the
existence of mutual policy preferences or business benefits including future
appointments. Since the investment arbitration regime is a small community, the
president of the tribunal might have social connections with one party
unbeknownst the other party and cannot be deemed as a solid ground for a
challenge. In contrast, judges are appointed for fixed terms while arbitrators are
appointed on case-by-case bases. This causes them to be keen on multiple
appointments. For this reason, the discipline from reputation or job security may
be insubstantial. This is in addition to the lack of an effective appeal mechanism

50

Pia Eberhardt and Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers
Are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, edit. By Helen Burley, Amsterdam: Transnational Institute,
November (2012).
51
Anton Strezhnev, Detecting Bias in International Investment Arbitration, 57th Annual Convention of the
International Studies Association - Atlanta, Georgia, March at 16-19, (2016); See also, Van Harten,
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 3, at 26, 30; See also Nathalie BernasconiOsterwalder, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and Host States on a
Level Playing Field? The Lauder/Czech Republic Legacy6:1 J World Inv’t& Trade 69(2005); See generally
Olivia Chung, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its E ﬀ ect on the Future of InvestorState Arbitration 47:4 Va J Int’lL 953 (2007).
52
ICSID Convention, supra note 8, Arbitration Rules, Art.(37) and (38).
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in investment arbitration. All of these concerns contest the legitimacy of
arbitrators in investment arbitration.53

This chapter explores the structural or political critiques addressed in the ITA
system that are represented in the hybrid nature of the system and the way through
which a balance between the states’ sovereignty and private property must be
achieved through adopting a public law approach in deciding investment
arbitrations. Further, it examines the existence of ideological bias that influences
the arbitrators’ decisions. It scrutinizes the role of their policy preferences and the
ideology of their decisions. It further sheds light on the procedural criticism of the
ITA regime such as the problem of party appointment that impugns the
independence and impartiality of the system. Further, it examines the way in
which arbitrators’ incentives correlate with their decisions. In doing so, this
chapter addresses two issues. Section one analyzes the first issue concerning the
structural and political problems that negatively influence the fairness of the ISDS
system. Section two scrutinizes the procedural issues affecting the system’s
independence demonstrated in the existence of the party appointment mechanism
and the moral hazard of arbitrators.

53

Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, ICSID Review-Foreign Investment
Law Journal no. 25 (2):339-355, (2010); See also, Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY
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A. STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL CRITIQUES OF THE ISDS
SYSTEM
The ITA system must be comprehended as a method of adjudicative review in
public law because it is established by the state’s sovereign actions and is
primarily used to resolve disputes that arise from the rights of the states to
exercise their sovereign authorities.54 To illustrate, investment treaty arbitration
predominantly constitutes a class of claims emanating from the effect of states’
regulatory measures that concerns public policies against the property of
investors. This differs from arbitration between states concerning conventional
international disputes and also differs from commercial disputes that arise
between private parties whereby the disputing parties can equally enjoy legal
rights and obligations. Therefore, this imbalance between the state’s sovereignty
and the investors’ is a distinctive character of the ITA system that raises concerns
about the independence of the whole system.
Investment treaty arbitration is a public law system; it concerns the regulatory
relation between individuals and states instead of engaging in a reciprocal relation
among juridical equals.55 Therefore, investment treaties are different from other
public international law treaties for permitting investors to bring claims against
host states according to procedural rules that are developed widely in the
international commercial arbitration’s context. Therefore, the system implants
dispute resolution mechanisms of a private international law nature into the realm
of public international law treaties.56
The above portrait is clearly represented in the establishment of the ICSID. The
purpose of establishing the ICSID in 1965 by the World Bank was to overcome
the problems of investment dispute settlement before domestic courts and under
the umbrella of diplomatic protection. The ICSID created a legal framework to
54
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settle investment disputes arising between foreign investors of contracting states
and member host states.57 It purportedly provides a neutral institutional and legal
structure aiming at protecting transnational investments and promoting foreign
direct investment and thus the economic development of member states.58 Upon
the consent of the parties to the ICSID jurisdiction, neither party has the right to
invoke its claims before any other local remedies,59 nor can the investor’s home
state exercise diplomatic protection60 unless the parties have agreed otherwise.61
This means that, the legal framework of the ICSID Convention converts the
protection of foreign investments into a substantive right instead of perceiving it
as a privilege, as it used to be under the diplomatic protection. The ICSID has
departed from using the wording of protecting private property and shifted it
towards the wording of protecting foreign investments for economic development.
In this, it has recreated the international investments rules for the purported aim of
promoting the international economic development of states.62 Thus, despite
shifting the wording of the aim of the Convention to be the protection of
international foreign direct investment, the main purpose and aim of the
Convention remains the same, that is, the protection of private property of the
capital-exporting countries. Further, such protection becomes the purpose for
achieving and promoting economic development among state members of the
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ICSID Convention.63 In addition, ratification of the ICSID Convention by states
does not amount to consent to arbitration under the auspices of the ICSID; it has
to be accompanied by the host state’s consent to an investor-state dispute
settlement provision that endorses the jurisdiction of the ICSID in the legal
instrument such as the BIT between the latter and the foreign investor’s home
state.64 Accordingly, Investment Treaty Arbitration serves as a distinctive
adjudicative mechanism of public international law that regulates the relation
between foreign investors and the host states through adjudicating the state’s
sovereign actions and regulatory measures within its territory before foreign
investors and corporations. Therefore, the ICSID does not admit disputes without
the prior waiver of the host state, as a respondent, to its sovereign immunity from
the arbitration. For that reason, the ITA system is different from commercial
arbitration.65
Another political criticism of the ITA system is that arbitrators decide disputes
under the influence of their ideology and policy preferences. In international
investment arbitration, on the one hand, there is a popular view that arbitrators are
adjudicators who apply the law regardless of their policy preferences, educational
backgrounds, and irrespective of any financial incentives they might receive.66 On
the other hand, anecdotes in addition to several academic studies criticize this
popular view.67 Since arbitrators are human beings, they cannot decide cases
pursuant to the role of law only. They are still human beings who cannot be
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righteous all the time because they have internal and external motivations that
influence their impartiality and make them deviate from the law in their decisions.
Such intrinsic influences exist because of the arbitrators’ ideologies and policy
preferences, and their specific mindsets and beliefs, which determine the sphere
of their interpretations of the rules of law and of their analyses of the disputing
parties’ arguments. As such, they render their decisions in accordance with their
inner beliefs and preferences subconsciously, and without leaving any doubt on
their independence and impartiality.

In light of the above, it is significant to discuss extensively the two political
criticisms of the present ISDS system in order to understand the impact of such
problems on the fairness of the whole ITA regime. As such, the following section
starts with examining the imbalance that the ITA system creates by enabling
adjudication between two unequal reciprocals the private investors and the
sovereign states and how this imbalance affects the host state’s regulatory powers
to amend its policies with the fear of facing a multitude of claims. Second, it
criticizes the fact that the state’s economic stability rests in the hands of private
adjudicators who adjudicate disputes in accordance with their ideological
preferences and in a way that is favorable to foreign investors.

1. The Imbalance between Sovereignty and Property
One way to understand the nature of the ITA system is through examining the
regulatory relationship that is created under investment treaties between foreign
investors and host states. Foreign investors usually challenge certain regulatory
measures that have been taken by their host states such as economic or
environmental legislative measures, health regulatory measures, and safety
safeguards, which affect them negatively.68 Instead of being private contractual
disputes, these disputes concern public actions and comprise public interests.
68
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Therefore, investment treaty arbitrations allow grievances to governmental
actions in a way reminiscent of judicial review in accordance with domestic law.69
Further, awards rendered in investment treaty arbitrations put a huge strain on the
economy of the host states.70 For example, in CME v. Czech Republic, the tribunal
ordered the Czech Republic to pay damages amounting to US$ 353 million to the
Dutch investor, an amount that is almost equivalent to the Czech Republic’s entire
health-care budget.71 This is due to the issuance of regulatory advice that
provoked the company to divest itself of a TV station.72 Another vital example is
the surge in investment arbitration cases against Argentina following Argentina’s
economic and financial crisis in early 2000.73 Argentina implemented various
reforms in order to restore its financial stability.74 Such reform measures
unfavorably affected many foreign investments that brought various cases before
the investment arbitration regime claiming a breach by Argentina to the standard
of protection envisaged in the treaty between it and their home states and relying
on the investor-state dispute settlement provision in these treaties.75
State sovereignty is a conceptual frame to understand the representative relation
with the people in its territory.76 Sovereignty envisages the treatment of a state as
an entity that represents and has authority over a group of people in connection
with the group members and in connection with other states. Sovereignty infers
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internal control and external independence on the state’s part.77 It is a tool for
contemplating the organization of people as political entities.78 Thus, it is a
principal concept of public international law as well as domestic law.79 A state,
within the international sphere, is the representative of its population and territory;
however, domestically, it is the source of the collective authority to make all
governmental decisions. A certain group of disputes may rise between the state
and private individuals that are subject to the state’s exercise of its sovereign
authority. This group of disputes is referred to as regulatory disputes that are
different from other public disputes that rise between states or between different
entities of the state. Further, the regulatory disputes must be differentiated from
private disputes that rise among individuals acting in their private capacity.80
Therefore, the party’s consent in commercial arbitration is given within the
party’s private sphere because the disputing parties, in their private capacity, have
decided to use a specific mechanism for resolving disputes arising between
them.81 They have consented, under the rules endorsed by the sovereign state, to
isolate the resolution of their disputes through different mechanisms that is
arbitration rather than through a state’s local courts. Conversely, when a state
decides to submit sovereign decisions to be reviewed before different adjudicative
bodies, it is considered a policy choice to use that specific adjudicative method as
a measure of its governing apparatus.82 Public Law adjudication is different from
reciprocal consensual adjudication under the private capacity of individuals
because the act of the state in consenting to the mechanism of adjudication is
exercised in its sovereign capacity and because of the fact that the subject matter
of the dispute rises as a consequence of the state’s exercise of its sovereign
authority.
77
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Conventionally, regulatory disputes in international law were settled before local
courts through applying the domestic laws of the state.83 Domestic law deals with
the state’s internal authority. In this, it concerns the constitution of the sovereign
authority, how it is delegated and exercised in the territory of the state.
International law, however, concerns the authority of the external state; it governs
the relation between states and the disputes arising between them.84 In this line, it
is rare to use international adjudication to resolve disputes between a state’s
treatment of an individual that is a national of a different state. In such cases, the
regulatory relation between the foreign nationals and the state was engaged by the
international adjudication. However, the occurrence of such cases was restricted
by doctrines of immunity, sovereign consent, and the duty for exhaustion of local
remedies.85 Regulatory disputes in the territory of the state were assumed to fall
under the exclusive domain of the legal system of the state while applying the
minimum standards of international law. Further, settling regulatory disputes
before international adjudication has never been accepted without the consent of
the state. The international dispute concerning a foreign national had to be
initiated by the home state and was perceived and dealt with as the home state’s
own claims.86 All these rules were derived from the customary assumption on the
nature of the authority of the state in its territory and the means whereby it could
be organized by the engagements of other states in order to adjudicate regulatory
disputes.
Where the regulatory relation among states falls directly under adjudication in
customary international law, a dispute was conceptually transformed to be
between juridical equals that are the states instead of being a mere regulatory
dispute between foreign individuals and the host state. Therefore, the regulatory
relation was made reciprocal under private law adjudication only. With the advent
83
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of disputes between private foreign investors and host states under investment
treaty arbitration, which usually do not entail the requirement of exhaustion of
local remedies, regulatory disputes have become adjudicated under international
arbitration such that the sovereign state and the individual investor directly face
each other as reciprocal disputing parties.
As a result, the regulatory relationship became the scope of a new private and
individualized form of international adjudication that is not, from now onwards,
reciprocally instituted. This reformation forms the genesis of the ITA system as a
governing and regulatory arrangement. It affects the genuine principles of public
international law including the legislative supremacy principle. Suffice it to note
that by commanding the state to consent to subjectig future disputes arising from
the exercise of its sovereign actions as a sovereign state, investment treaties
accord a comprehensive jurisdiction to private arbitrators in order to adjudicate
investor-state disputes that fall under the regulatory sphere in the first place.
Customary international law postulates that the adjudication of regulatory
disputes concerning a foreign national is a matter of the host state’s domestic
law.87 States must not be subjected to mandatory dispute adjudication in their
territory neither by foreign courts nor by any international tribunal. 88 A dispute
concerning the treatment of a state towards a foreign investor of a different state
conventionally might trigger a diplomatic protection claim by the latter’s home
state,89 however, the investors are not permitted to bring an independent claim
against a sovereign host state.90 Further, a claim concerning diplomatic protection
initiated by the national home state of the foreign individual is possible on
condition that the foreign individual has previously exhausted the local remedies
in order to enable the host state the opportunity to resolve the claims of the
87
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investor prior to resorting to international law.91 Even after the exhaustion of local
remedies, resolving the dispute through the international adjudication is never
possible without the consent of the host state. The reluctance of states to resort
investment disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has shown that a
low number of cases concerning the regulatory relation between foreign investors
and states have been brought before the court.92 Prior to the proliferation of states’
general consent to the ITA, these regulatory disputes were ordinarily settled via
inter-state diplomacy.93
This conventional mechanism of adjudicating regulatory disputes on the
international level is grounded on the presumption that the entitlement of an
investor to protection under international law within the territory of a foreign land
is derived from the investor’s home state’s rights.94 Therefore, the host state might
aggravate or moderate disputes concerning foreign individuals in its negotiations
with the foreign individual’s home state.95 International disputes were subject to
the balancing of the home state between its own interests and considerations of
good faith in international relations.96 By bestowing investors with the power to
initiate a claim and seek compensations because of an alleged violation of
international law, ITA permits investors to choose the right time to threaten,
initiate, or resolve a claim against host states. In view of that, the claimant
becomes a private party possessing full custody of the dispute who has enormous
power in deciding when and to what extent international adjudication may be used
to settle its regulatory dispute.
In the same vein, individualization of investment claims changes the operation of
international adjudication by encountring numerous implications. The protection
91
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of the investors’ rights under bilateral investment treaties is no longer impacted by
the consideration of the home state’s own interests as a representative authority.97
Accordingly, foreign investors are in a position to initiate their claims in a way
that represents their own interests more vigorously because they do not have any
interests to settle or conciliate for public interests’ reasons.98 For example, in
Siemens v. Argentina, the tribunal accepted the claimant’s argument that the
presence of the MFN provision in the BIT gives the investor the right to mix-andmatch different provisions which favor its position, and to construct them in one
favorable form, consisting of various substantive and procedural rights, in order to
get the utmost benefit for protecting its rights.99
In addition, in investment treaty arbitration, only investors can bring claims
against their host states. 100 This is significant because it reveals the conversion of
arbitration into a one-way method of adjudicating instead of being a reciprocal
adjudication process between two equal parties. Another implication is that it
extends the possibilities for the tribunals to adopt an expansive approach in
determining their jurisdiction under an investment treaty. Accordingly, investors
usually advocate a broad approach to the liability of the state other than what is
embraced by state parties. What is significant is that by enabling investors to
claim these arguments, the ITA system creates an environment where arbitrators
are allowed to adopt an expansive interpretation of the treaty provisions even
though such an approach contradicts with the unanimous state’s submissions that
negotiated and ratified it. Such an environment is not established under
international custom whereby access to dispute resolution is limited to states.
Furthermore, the ITA system bestows power on private arbitrators without
providing for an appeal mechanism, resulting in the broadening of their
discretionary powers in deciding cases in light of their ideologies and policy
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preferences and thus resulting in an unfair decision that affects the economic
stability and reputations of the host states.
2. Ideology and Policy Preferences of Arbitrators
The formalist view in international investment arbitration holds that adjudicators
of the ISDS system apply the rules of the law regardless of their policy
preferences, backgrounds, and views.101 They argue that the ISDS system is a
legitimate and depoliticized system for the settlement of investment disputes.
Such a view ignores one of the main contentions of legal realism that is the
outcome of the case is not decided in accordance with the mere application of the
law alone.102

In the legal realist view, judges are as important as the law in deciding and
determining the outcome of the case.103 More specifically in the controversial
areas of investment arbitration where ambiguity is left to the discretion of the
arbitrators’ interpretations, the outcomes may diverge due to the influence of
different ideologies and policy preferences of the arbitrators when adjudicating.
To illustrate, the balance that an arbitrator makes among competing
considerations can be influenced by his/her ideology, professional experience,
background, and certain incentives that s/he might receive when deciding the
case. For example, the arbitrator may be acting as a counsel in other cases and
his/her impartial view in a particular case as an arbitrator might affect his/her role
as a counsel in the other case.

Studies on political voting and collegiate politics hold a significant place in the
literature of political science in the US courts.104 In this literature, it is perceived
101
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that the courts are political bodies, and thus, judges are deemed to be policy
makers. This assumes that judicial decisions are driven by judicial politics and/or
judicial ideology.105 In international disputes where one party is a state, many
scholars have selected the developing status of the adjudicators as a prominent
cause of bias.106 For instance, Eric A.Posner and Miguel Figueiredo found that
members of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) tend to favor the interests of
their appointing states, or the states at the same wealth level of their own states.
They used statistical methods to test bias and found strong evidence that
supported such a bias.107 Furthermore, in 2007, Erik Voeten108 demonstrated that
judges of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) are inclined to not vote
with their home states. In the same vein, in international arbitration, Susan Frank
denies that the appointed arbitrators who come from developing countries are
more likely to uphold jurisdiction and declare the host state’s liability rather than
their counterparts from developed countries.109 One must say that the question of
whether arbitrators from developing countries are biased against investors from
developed countries remains open. However, I believe that arbitrators from
developing countries will not, most probably, uphold the liability of the
developing host states because they are aware of the economic and social
circumstances in such states; and therefore, feel sympathetic towards rendering a
decision that will cause a deficit in these developing countries.
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Additionally, another factor that influences the policy preferences of arbitrators is
their argumentative mindsets, which originate and develop in sociological
analysis of commercial arbitration.110 This means that the mindsets of arbitrators
are shaped in accordance with their professional experience and thus it affects
how they adjudicate arbitration cases.111 On equal footing and in investment
arbitration, arbitrators who have experience in working in the private sector tend
to favor investors; however, those who have work experience with governments
tend to favor host states.112

One manifestation of this partiality tendency is to give greater prominence to the
protection of property rights, which is investment, over other social and economic
goals of host states represented in their regulatory measures to protect their
environmental and public policies. For instance, one might think that conservative
arbitrators are biased toward investment protection; however, progressive
arbitrators may have a greater tendency toward social standards such as
environmental protection and other public policy standards. Erik Voeten shows
that judges with communist backgrounds in Eastern Europe are ideologically
committed to adjusting human rights abuses in their home countries, in contrast to
judges from Western Europe.113 In international investment arbitration, we
assume that arbitrators with public international law backgrounds are more
concerned with host states, and hence, tend to favor the latter in their decisions.
Conversely, arbitrators with private law backgrounds, whether as private counsels
or as arbitrators, deviate toward the investor and perhaps are likely to uphold
jurisdiction and grant indemnifications to investors.
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For the foregoing reasons, in international investment arbitration, arbitrators’
decisions are swayed in accordance with their policy preferences toward one of
the disputing parties. Put differently, arbitrators from developing countries favor
the interests of host states, unlike arbitrators from developed countries who favor
the private sector comprised of the foreign investors. Furthermore, arbitrators with
public international law backgrounds or who have work experience in
governments tend to favor host states; arbitrators who have work experience in
corporations or have private law background tend to favor foreign investors.

In line with the above, the selection of arbitrators in investment arbitration is quite
significant to the outcome of the case. Since the investment arbitration regime is a
close-knit network, it is easy to find and collect all the necessary information
about a potential arbitrator before selecting him/her. Selection here means the
method by which the disputing parties to an ICSID arbitration case appoint their
arbitrators. Practically, the disputing parties together with their counsels allocate
sufficient time and exert huge effort to scrutinize arbitrators’ backgrounds, for
example, whether they have any correlation with the parties, their published work
and especially if they have a clear opinion related to the substantive claims of the
case; policy preferences; and previous appointments. This research is conducted
to help the disputing parties in appointing the arbitrators who appear to have
favorable tendencies towards their case but without reaching the level of bias that
triggers challenges to the existence of conflict of interest. For example, arbitrators
may be chosen because they share the same cultural or legal backgrounds with the
parties who appointed them.114 The disputing parties may agree to some specific
characteristics of the appointed arbitrators, for example, a specific field of
experience necessary for the arbitration, non-lawyers, or arbitrators with certain
language skills. The time allocated for selecting the proper arbitrators reveals the
important correlation that exists between the backgrounds and policy preferences
114
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of arbitrators and the outcome of the case. Otherwise, it would be unreasonable
for the disputing parties and their attorneys to spend much time and hard work on
choosing the right arbitrators for their dispute.

In domestic courts, the panel effect does exist in legal decisions.115 This section
tackles the significant role of collegial politics among panel members on judicial
outcomes. In investment arbitration under ICSID, members of the tribunal are not
unitary actors; usually it consists of three arbitrators who, most probably, do not
share the same policy preferences. Decisions rendered in investment arbitration
may be affected by collegiate politics.116 For instance, members of the tribunal
may have different or mutual preferences. Usually, elite arbitrators act together,
and therefore, play repetitive games.117 They are members of a profitable and
exclusive club, whose members might be compared to a club of predominantly
European, well-known, and grey-haired men.118

Since the ICSID community is a close-knit network, sometimes conformity
pressures arbitrators in ICSID arbitration. In this, arbitrators might diminish or
strengthen one another’s policy preferences. Collegiality, deference, or persuasion
play a significant role in amplifying the bias issue. For instance, one member of
the tribunal may not disagree with the majority regardless of his/her preliminary
different view, because s/he might have been persuaded by the majority’s
influence, or because of other tactical reasons. Furthermore, deliberation is an
important part of decision making. To illustrate, instinctive decisions of
arbitrators may involve fast decisions which bend toward their policy preferences;
however, these decisions may perhaps be revised and reviewed in deliberations
with the rest of the tribunal’s members. Therefore, a panel impact occurs when
the personal characteristics of its members strengthen the bias. Furthermore, when
115
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personal characteristics are widely shared among members of the same tribunal,
such preferences also have a strong influence on the tribunal’s decisions. All the
foregoing ideological predisposition affect, more or less, the decision making
process of arbitrators.

Since the legitimacy crisis of the current ISDS system is demonstrated in two
main problems; the political or structural issues and the procedural problems of
the system, it is significant to shed light on the procedural issues demonstrated in
the lack of independence and impartiality of the system in its entirety. In this, the
following section discusses the various procedural problems of the system
represented in the existence of the party appointment mechanism and the moral
hazard of arbitrators.

B. PROCEDURAL CRITIQUES
In the outset, there is an acknowledgment of the important role the institutions
involved in the decision-making process in investment arbitration play. For
institutional theorists, there are a number of significant institutional methods that
shape the values and behavior of adjudicators, for example, the selection process,
their tenure status, their financial reliance on the repetitive appointments of the
institution, and their intrinsic sense of obligation for that institution.119 If these
methods are not perceived as independent and impartial, the system will
eventually lose its integrity as a neutral means of adjudication. The importance of
the system’s integrity is demonstrated in the fact that it is based on trust. The
parties must have faith that their dispute will be adjudicated in a fair and unbiased
manner.

This section argues that, the systematic bias demonstrated in the selection process
of arbitrators, besides the lack of tenure, results in the rendering of a biased
adjudication. These aspects affect the independence and impartiality of
119
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arbitrators, so that they become dependent on the prospective claimants contrary
to judges who enjoy secure tenure and are perceived to be independent. In this
section, the notion of independence and impartiality stricto sensu is discussed.
Second, the criticism of the mechanism of party appointment is highlighted then
followed by a demonstration of the moral hazard of arbitrators.
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1. The Notion of Independence and Impartiality
The notion of independence and impartiality means that adjudicators decide cases
without the interference of any external influences or manipulations. Albeit the
two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, each one has a distinctive
meaning. Independence concerns the lack of any relation between the parties to a
dispute and the appointed arbitrators. One can distinguish between individual
independence and institutional independence.120Individual independence concerns
the independence of the adjudicator herself/himself directly. This type of
independence is considered an obligation on the arbitrator because s/he is required
to decide the case without any external influences. Further, it is a privilege of the
arbitrator because neither the state nor any other institution should influence the
decision making of the arbitrator.121

There are safeguards assigned to ensure the independence of arbitrators; these are
the rules on qualifications, rules on conflict of interest, rules of disclosure, and the
disqualifications rules.122 On the other hand, institutional independence shall
ensures that the institution’s member arbitrators are secure in exercising their
powers. It entitles the institution and not the arbitrators. Further, it is generally
assured through the institution’s autonomy with regard to its internal organization,
its budget, and transparent rules of the recruitment process. 123 Institutional
safeguards can be achieved through an objective method of case assignment,
ensuring a secure tenure of arbitrators, and the appointment of arbitrators for fixed
terms.124
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Impartiality, however, relates to the lack of predisposition toward one of the
parties or a certain legal issue in a given case.125 In this way, arbitrators have to
exercise their powers as adjudicators free from any favoritism and to adopt the
behavior that reduces the risk of challenges. Thus, impartiality is, unlike
independence, presented as a duty and not as a privilege.126 Independence is a
broader concept than impartiality and it is said that independence is a prerequisite
to impartial decision-making.127

The two terms collectively constitute one standard and are used to describe
bias.128Three possible grounds can be invoked to challenge the independence and
impartiality of arbitrators. These are the existence of a personal, financial, or
professional relationship between any of the arbitrators and one party, the
existence of any of the arbitrators and one of the counsels representing any of the
parties, and issue conflicts.129

The standard of independence and impartiality are differentiated from the
provisions concerning the qualifications of arbitrators, which deal with the
arbitrators’ obligation to be independent and impartial;130 the arbitrators’
disclosure,131 which is usually used to disclose any conflict of interest between the
arbitrator and any of the parties and their counsels; and the disqualification
challenges of arbitrators.132 These provisions set the general framework for the
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arbitrators’ independence. The common test of independence and impartiality that
is applied among all fora is to decide the standard of the appearance of bias; the
intensity of possibility of bias; and that the bias, from a reasonable person’s point
of view, gives rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and impartiality of
the arbitrator.133 The normal basis for reviewing independence in investment
arbitration is the appearance of the common test, which tackles the reasonable
perception of bias by the decision makers.134
Having said that, the problem of independence and impartiality when it is related
to a violation of the applicable rules is easy to tackle and deal with through the
applicable challenging process of arbitrators. However, the origin and the reason
behind the emergence of such a problem that is the existence of the party
appointment mechanism requires examination. Put differently, the ISDS system
consists of ad hoc tribunals whose members are appointed by the disputing
parties. As such, each party chooses the co-arbitrator who best serves its claims.
Thus, arbitrators render a favorable award toward their appointing party aiming at
future appointments from perspective claimants, which is represented here as the
moral hazard of arbitrators.
2. Problems of Party Appointment Mechanism
Parties choose their arbitrators not only based on their experience and skills, but
also on the assumption that the arbitrator will enhance their probability of winning
the case or not.135 This argument is recognized in the challenged decision of
Professor Phillippe Sands in the ICSID case of OPIC Karimum Corporation v.
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Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.136The two unchallenged arbitrators pointed out
that:

In our view, multiple appointments of an arbitrator are an objective
indication of the view of parties and their counsel that the outcome of the
dispute is more likely to be successful with the multiple appointee as a
member of the tribunal than would otherwise be the case.
Furthermore, the pivotal role that independence and impartiality play in
determining the legitimacy of the tribunals’ decisions and the whole system
should not be left to party autonomy.137 Secure tenure is an additional means that
could shield adjudicators from influential private interests and from rumors that
might arise concerning their independence and impartiality. In this way, no one
can simply say that a judge, in deciding a specific case, was influenced by his/her
personal career interests. In this regard, the public law nature of the international
investment arbitration system becomes critical. Recognizing the existence of the
political basis for the system, only investors are allowed to bring claims against
their host states and not vice versa.138 Accordingly, arbitrators have a personal
interest in interpreting the rules of law in a way that is favorable to investors in
order to encourage claims.139

When an arbitrator belongs to a certain adjudicative industry, s/he might be
interested in interpreting the law in a way that favors the interests of investors in
any related potential claims in order to have future appointments as part of the
growth of the industry. Arbitrators are different from judges; they work in a
market in which suppliers from capital exporting states underlying individual
standings are interested in advancing their own status and that of the whole
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industry.140 Another distinction is that arbitrators are entitled to have another
source of income from different activities besides their adjudicative role including
acting as private counsels in investment law. Therefore, the investment industry
encompasses a number of arbitrators, in addition to lawyers who work as counsel
of either investors or states, who might serve as arbitrators as well, and who may
participate in the negotiating and drafting of treaties and the different rules of
arbitration.141 It also encompasses a number of experts and scholars who might as
well work as expert witnesses, arbitrators in a specific case, or as
advisors.142Since arbitration is a close-knit industry, it is not difficult to say that it
contains many cross-connected players who might be interested in expanding
their networks by recommending each other for future appointments, sharing
details about their awards, blacklisting whomever swims against the flow, or
adopting an approach that favors their own industries relative to their competitors,
for example, domestic adjudication and international diplomacy. It is crystal clear
to whomever is well acquainted with this industry that international investment
arbitration will not prosper unless businessmen and businesswomen who own
assets in the extensive parts of the world know that it is not futile to bring claims
against Third World states i.e. capital importing states.143

The purpose of secure tenure is demonstrated in the dismissal of any external
influences on adjudicators when deciding a case. To illustrate, they only focus on
interpreting the case at hand with neutral and impartial interpretations of the rule
of law and in accordance with the given facts of the case. Put differently, the
absence of the secure tenure results in the return of career interests; thus, it may
be perceived by an outsider that the interpretation of the tribunal of a treaty or its
decision is biased towards the interests of the investor, even though such
140
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interpretation might have been done in a neutral way. This is because it is
influenced by external factors rather than impartial treaty interpretation and
application.

No one can assure the existence of these external influences on the independence
and impartiality of arbitrators. For example, empirical results shows that tribunals
declined their jurisdiction in about 20% of the published cases and held
jurisdiction in about 50% of the remaining published cases.144 Where the bias here
is perceived, it does not reflect the impartiality and independence of the system.
This is because it does not provide an answer to the question of whether claimants
would probably win before court proceedings, rather than before arbitral tribunals.
Further, it does not provide a logical explanation of whether fundamental legal
issues, for example, forum shopping, the scope of Most Favored Nation treatment,
or Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET), would be decided differently or not.

In the same vein, the mechanism of party appointment has created incentives for
arbitrators to favor the party with whom they may gain future appointments from.
Since the ITA system enables only investors to bring claims against host states,
arbitrators tend to favor positions that best serve the prospective claimants in
order to increase future appointments. This is what is referred to as the moral
hazard of arbitrators.

3. The Moral Hazard
Assuming, in arguendo, that arbitrators’ decisions are independent from their
policy preferences, the commonly expressed public concerns regarding the
independence and impartiality of investment arbitrators run deep. To illustrate,
ICSID arbitrators are not appointed to full time jobs. This means that, they neither
enjoy security of tenure, nor do they have fixed salaries. Consequently, they have
144
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other work to do in addition to being arbitrators. For example, they might act as
counsels in different arbitrations, give expert opinions to either host states or
investors, work as academics, or, as mentioned earlier, they might have served in
a full time public service position, such as in the executive or the legislative
sectors of states, or even as judges before domestic courts. This spinning wheel of
jobs in the close-knit network of investment arbitration may have led the
arbitrators to being biased toward a certain party. Whether such bias is intentional,
unintentional, or obvious to reach the level of challenges for disqualification of
arbitrators, in that way it threatens the impartiality and independence of
arbitrators. For instance, an arbitrator might be in a position to decide an issue
against one party, while arguing against that position for the interest of his/her
client in his/her capacity as a counsel in another case.

When the sole income for an arbitrator is the fee earned from arbitrations, such as
academics, perhaps s/he tends to favor the party with the more financial
incentives which is the foreign investor. In this regard, Gus Van Harten, when
criticizing the international investment arbitration, contends that arbitrators have a
financial interest in rendering arbitrations’ to claimants, i.e. foreign investors,
which results in an actual or potential partiality against host states. 145 Another
critique is the bias resulting from concerns about reputation.146 On the one hand,
lawyers who often represent investors in investment arbitrations are more likely to
be biased against host states in cases where they are appointed as arbitrators. They
may question the states’ actions and consider them arbitrary. On the other hand,
counsels who usually represent host states in investment arbitrations are likely to
reject investors’ claims against the host states’ actions and regulatory measures
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and show their tendency toward these host states in order to build a reputation in
being pro-states in the arbitration market.

In sum, incentives influence arbitrators to be biased toward their interests. In this
regard, an arbitrator whose income depends solely on the fee from arbitrations is
not likely to reject jurisdiction. Furthermore, an arbitrator in a given investment
arbitration who happens to be the counsel for another investor in a different case
that invokes the same subject matter of the case he is adjudicating will deviate in
his/her decision as arbitrator toward the interest of the investor that he is
representing in the other case. Finally, arbitrators usually lean towards the interest
of the party who frequently appoints them.147 Despite the fact that both factors
have an impact on arbitrators and thus sabotage the fairness and neutrality of their
decisions, both factors can work in different directions. For instance, when the
incentives factor is prominent, it prevails over the policy preference factor, and
hence, arbitrators will favor the party that benefits them materially, rather than
favoring the party of their policy preference. In contrast, policy preferences play a
significant role in arbitrators’ decisions in the absence of incentives.

The method of balancing the two factors depends on the method of appointment
of arbitrators. In the party appointment mechanism, the disputing parties, as
mentioned earlier, ideally balance between arbitrators’ policy preferences and
incentives when appointing the arbitrators. Therefore, it is important to examine
such compromises with regard to the presiding arbitrator, who is selected either
by party appointment or by the ICSID secretary.148 When the president of the
tribunal is appointed through ICSID, and since the presiding arbitrator will be
more independent and impartial from the disputing parties, the impact of his/her
policy preferences prevail over the influence of incentives on the award.
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Having discussed the critiques addressed to the legitimacy and the independence
of the ITA system in this chapter, it is significant to shed light on the relevant case
law whereby we can see the effect of ideology and policy preferences on the
decision making of arbitrators under the ICSID Convention.
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III.

MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE AND DETECTION OF
BIAS

The Most favored Nation is one of the core elements in BITs. 149It is the standard
of protection that aims at avoiding discrimination between the parties to a certain
BIT, such as the standards of national treatment and Fair and Equitable Treatment
(FET).150 The dramatic increase in investment arbitrations has had a significant
impact on the interpretation of the standards of BITs. Practically, some standards
have grown in density and proven interaction with others, while other standards
have appeared to have an independent nature.151 In international investment
arbitration and up until the past decade, the debate on the MFN clause focused on
its substantial application.152 The debate concerned the limitations of the
regulatory measures of host states in investment policy and the notion of
investment.153 However, since 2000, the discussions have shifted since the award
rendered in the ICSID case of Maffezini v. Spain.154 In this award, the tribunal
found that the standard of the MFN can be extended further than what had been
comprehended before. One unique feature in this award is the unusual
interpretation of the Tribunal concerning the scope of the MFN clause in its
adoption of an expansive approach in interpretation; this is in contrast to the
common norm of applying a restrictive interpretation to only include the
importation of substantive provisions from a comparator treaty.155 The Maffezini’s
award is considered the turning point in the interpretation and application of the
MFN clause. The finding of the Maffezini Tribunal has developed the scope of the
standard from being applied strictly substantively to being extended to encompass
149
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procedure of dispute settlement. Since this award, there have been a number of
inconclusive awards concerning the scope of application of the MFN clause to
procedural matters.156 Such contradicting adjudications are influenced by many
complex and controversial factors that differ from one case to another.

It is worth mentioning that the conflicting arguments on the right scope of
application of the MFN standard need further interpretation by the jurisprudence.
In this, the UNCTAD noted that:“…There are strong arguments both for and
against applying the MFN clause to dispute settlement. In the end, this issue may
need further clarification by international investment jurisprudence.”157

The debate about the MFN application to procedural provisions is divided into
two groups. One group agrees to the expansive interpretation and thus the
encompassing of procedural provisions. However, the second group argues that it
cannot be extended.158 With such variable interpretations, it is possible to notice
that the likelihood to foresee, with any level of certainty, the obligations that one
party undertakes when integrating the MFN clause in international investment
156
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arbitration, has diminished substantially within the regime. To illustrate, there is
no predictable outcome for the application of the MFN clause. Both parties to a
dispute would have doubts about their arguments, in light of the application of the
MFN provision, when they witness that their same arguments that have been
rejected in one case succeeded in another.159 With regard to investors, this legal
uncertainty will not help them in assessing the commercial risk of their
investments, whereas states might be incapable of exercising their legislative
powers without being exposed to the risk of multiple litigations.160 This means
that when appointing the panel of arbitrators in a case invoking the scope of
application of the MFN clause to procedural matters, the parties commonly pay
attention to the previous tendency of their potential arbitrator. They do so through
extensive research about her/his previous appointments in similar cases invoking
the same issue; her/his position in those cases whether s/he was party appointed
arbitrator or the president of the tribunal; and her/his previous dissenting opinions,
if any.

Since there is no broad multilateral convention that is enriched with unified
wording and provides for a standard of application of the MFN clause, there is a
lack of consistency in the wording and the application of the MFN clause in
investment arbitration.161 To illustrate, the MFN principle is embodied in various
clauses that dramatically differ in their texts and context; and thus, they differ in
their interpretation. The hypotheses in this chapter examines arbitrators’
interpretation in adopting the expansive or the restrictive approach to the
controversial issue of the scope of application of the MFN clause under BITs
159
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when there is an ambiguity or absence in the text of the treaty. It aims at
analyzing the adopted approach by the tribunal in certain cases. Then it attempts
to correlate such resolutions with the arbitrators’ ideologies. The focus here is on
the question of whether the scope of application of the MFN clause should be
extended to procedural provisions of other BITs, such as the dispute settlement
clause, or not. The expansive approach in interpretation is always in favor of
investors; however, the restrictive interpretation is usually favorable to the host
states.162

The first two sections analyze the legal reasoning of the tribunals in adopting the
expansive163 and restrictive164 approaches in investment arbitration cases. In brief,
the expansive approach in interpreting the scope of the MFN clause is indicated
by the extension of its application to non-substantive or procedural provisions of
other treaties to cover the dispute settlement provisions. On the other hand, the
restrictive approach rejects the extension of dispute resolution provisions from
other treaties into the basic treaty in question. Section three focuses on the legal
analysis of two contradictory awards, in which the same article within BIT was
interpreted differently by two different tribunals leading to different decisions the
thing that reflects the effect of ideology and policy preferences of arbitrators on
their decision making.

It is important to mention that this paper does not aim to resolve the controversial
issue concerning the mixed interpretations of the MFN clause. However, it only
analyzes the existing case law in light of the ideological preference of the
members of the tribunal in order to be able to test the correlation between the
interpretations of the clause with the ideological predisposition of arbitrators.
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The controversial debate concerning the interpretation of the MFN clause has
begun with Argentina. The core of the debate is based on many of Argentina’s
BITs that require the dispute to be submitted before national courts for an 18month period, giving the local courts the opportunity to decide on the dispute in
that given period. Generally, foreign investors consider such provision to be
ineffective at best and absurd at worst. Thus, they seek to escape this step through
invoking the application of the MFN clause on the dispute settlement provision
from a comparator BIT that does not contain such requirement. Ironically, the first
case that dealt with this point was raised by an Argentinean investor against the
Kingdom of Spain in the Maffezini case.165

Afterwards, multiple awards,166 which all invoked the 18 months period
requirement and in accordance with Argentinean BITs, followed the approach
adopted in the Maffezini case. Albeit it shall always be left to the interpretation of
the wording of every BIT separately, this tendency has resulted in the conclusion
that the MFN clause might regularly be invoked to evade any procedural obstacles
such as the cooling off period requirement.167 After nearly eight years, the arbitral
tribunal in the ICSID case of Wintershall v. Argentina,168 having the International
Jurist, Professor/ Fali Sam Nairman, reversed the debate in the opposite direction
when considering a nearly similar provision in the Germany-Argentine BIT. This
decision disrupted the earlier decision rendered in the case of Siemens v.
Argentina, in which the tribunal adjudicated in favor of the German investor in
the course of application of the same BIT between Germany and Argentine.169 In
the same vein, in Plama and Salini cases, the investors attempted to submit their
allegations through other procedures or fora than those stipulated in the applicable
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BIT by invoking the MFN clause. The tribunals in these cases declined such
attempts.170

A. THE EXPANSIVE APPROACH171
The leading ICSID cases that adopted the expansive approach allowing the
extension of the MFN clause to encompass the procedural matters are Maffezini v.
Spain;172 Siemens v. Argentine,173 and Gas Natural SDG v. Argentine.174 It is
worth mentioning that Emilio Agustín Maffezini, the claimant in the Maffezini
case, holds the Argentinian nationality. In the Maffezini case, the tribunal set
specific standards on the language of the text used in the BIT.175 It also raised the
standards of state practice that might be vital in interpreting the MFN clause.176
Moreover, the tribunal placed some limitations on the application of the MFN
clause to procedural rights, which are significant because they are grounded on
public policy concerns and are explained in a manner that prevents the disputing
parties from the abuse of rights.177 Following the Maffezini case, many subsequent
decisions confirmed that foreign investors could rely on the MFN clause of the
basic treaty to invoke the most favorable dispute settlement provision of a
comparator treaty that does not entail the 18-month period rule.178

In the ICSID Case of Siemens v. Argentina, despite having a less broad MFN
clause than in the Maffezini case, the tribunal applied the same reasoning that was
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given in the Maffezini case through reinforcing the expansive approach. This case
concerns a German investor that attempted to escape the 18-month period
required in the Germany-Argentina BIT of 1991 and tried to invoke the MFN
clause in order to enjoy the more favorable provisions of the Chile-Argentina
BIT, which did not have such requirements.

One main difference between the two cases, besides the fact that Argentina was in
this case the respondent, is that the wording of the MFN clause in the GermanyArgentina BIT was more explicitly limited in scope than the one in Maffezini.179
Despite the fact that Argentina had urged this distinction upon the Tribunal, it was
not successful. The tribunal concluded that the wording of the clause provides for
a distinction and not a difference.180Albeit the tribunal’s decision was similar to
the one of the Maffezini case, in this case the tribunal, to a large extent, provided
for more extensive explanation on the methodology and the rationale behind its
decision. In doing so, it expressly confirmed its understanding that the purpose of
a treaty is to promote and protect investments. While this is not untrue, we must
be careful not to put much weight on such statements in BITs because in doing so
the tribunal might end up resolving all doubtful questions in favor of investors,
giving reason that providing protection is always the better way to maintain the
purpose of the treaty.

Afterwards, in the ICSID case of Gas Natural SDG v. Argentine,181 the tribunal
concluded that the most crucial element of any BIT is “the provision of
independent international arbitration of disputes between investors and host
sates.”182 From the investors’ perspective, the standard of treatment and
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guarantees are of less significance until they are subject to a dispute settlement
system and finally to enforcement.183 Therefore, the value of the protection,
provided for in a treaty to an investor is a function of the terms of the explicit
provisions and also of the quality of the mechanism through which the investor
would be able to enforce those rights against the host state. Meanwhile, from the
perspective of the host state, the consent given to arbitration is a concession; it is a
waiver of the sovereign prerogative of the state in order not to be dragged to
international courts without its consent.184 Therefore, the interests of the state
include safeguarding the presence of an unbiased forum, which will never
overstep the boundaries of state consent and intervene in domestic policy
matters.185

B. THE RESTRICTIVE APPROACH
Another approach adopted by a group of adjudicators demonstrates an opposite
tendency of the tribunals concerning the scope of application of the MFN clause
on procedural matters, i.e. on the dispute settlement clause. These cases are Salini
v. Jordan,186 Plama v. Bulgaria,187 Wintershall v. The Argentine Republic,188 and
Daimler Financial Services AG v. The Argentine Republic.189 A brief about the
Tribunals’ findings in Plama, Salini, and Wintershall follows. The Tribunal’s
reasoning and findings in Daimler will be discussed in the following section.

In Salini v. Jordan, a dispute was raised concerning the final payment that was
due to two Italian companies after finishing the construction of the Karameh Dam
in Jordan. According to Article 9 of the Jordan-Italy BIT, disputes arising out of
treaty violations are subject to ICSID arbitration; however, it also stated that the

183

Id.
Id, ¶ 28-30.
185
Id, ¶ 49.
186
Salini Decision, supra note 153.
187
Plama Decision, supra note 153.
188
Wintershall Decision, supra note 153.
189
Daimler Decision, supra note 153.
184

46

contractual dispute settlement procedures would prevail if the investment was
made pursuant to an investment agreement.190

Indeed, an investment contract was concluded regarding the Dam project whereby
disputes must be settled in Jordanian national courts unless the disputing parties
agreed to submit the conflict to arbitration. In spite of this stipulation, the Italian
claimants attempt to submit their contractual claims before an ICSID tribunal
claiming that Jordan's BITs with the United States and other states gave investors
from these states the right to submit contractual claims to arbitration; and thus, the
MFN clause should allow Italian investors to do the same. The Tribunal rejected
this argument and declined its jurisdiction over contractual claims; however, it did
state that it could have exercised its jurisdiction if the dispute had arisen out of
violations of the treaty.191

The Tribunal reasoned such an outcome by distinguishing both the MFN
provision included in Articles 3(1) and (2)192 and Article 9(2)193 from those at
issue in Ambatielos and Maffezini. It provided:
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The Tribunal observes that the circumstances of this case are different
[than in Maffezini and Ambatielos]. Indeed, Article 3 of the BIT between
Italy and Jordan does not include any provision extending its scope of
application to dispute settlement. It does not envisage 'all rights or all
matters covered by the agreement'. Furthermore, the Claimants have
submitted nothing from which it might be established that the common
intention of the Parties was to have the most-favored nation clause apply
to dispute settlement. Quite on the contrary, the intention as expressed in
Article 9(2) of the BIT was to exclude from ICSID jurisdiction contractual
disputes between an investor and an entity of a State Party in order that
such disputes might be settled in accordance with the procedures set forth
in the investment agreements. Lastly, the Claimants have not cited any
practice in Jordan or Italy in support of their claims. From this, the
Tribunal concludes that Article 3 of the BIT does not apply insofar as
dispute settlement clauses are concerned.194
It is obvious that the tribunal in Salini had its mind set on its own conclusion that
the MFN provision should only apply if it is expressly stipulated that the parties
intended to extend its effect over the specific disputed issue.

The conclusion of Salini’s tribunal is justified by the fundamental rule of
international law that the jurisdiction of an international tribunal is based on
consent, not on the grounds of the tribunal's understanding of MFN clauses not
extending to dispute settlement mechanisms. In other words, the specific
provisions of the concerned treaty and the factual surroundings in which the MFN
claim is raised are more valuable than any general principle that interprets MFN
clauses in a "broad" or "narrow" scope.

In the Plama Case, the tribunal decided on whether the procedure of arbitration as
a whole could be integrated from a third BIT by virtue of an MFN clause
necessitates interpretation of an unambiguous agreement by the parties to that

Contracting Parties, should come out a legal framework according to which the investors of the other
Contracting Party would be granted a more favorable treatment than the one foreseen in this Agreement,
the treatment granted to the investors of such other Parties will apply also for outstanding relationships.”
193
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effect in the basic BIT that stipulates so. The dispute in this case concerned the
Bulgarian government's treatment of an oil refinery in Bulgaria by a Cypriot
company. The claimant submitted the dispute to ICSID arbitration rather than to
the Bulgarian courts relying on the MFN clause in the Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT. The
Cyprus-Bulgaria BIT, nevertheless, had no provision that allowed submitting
disputes to the ICSID arbitration. The BIT provided for arbitration (a) only after
the domestic legal system had concluded that an expropriation had occurred and
(b) only to resolve a dispute as to the amount of compensation due for the
claimant. Such disputes about the amount of compensation could be brought
either before a domestic court or an international Ad hoc Arbitration Court.195
The claimant nevertheless submitted the dispute to ICSID arbitration relying on
the MFN clause.

The MFN clause envisaged in article 3 of Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT states that: "Each
Contracting Party shall treat investments in its territory by investors of the other
Contracting Party a treatment that is not less favorable than that accorded to
investments by investors of third states.”196 The Tribunal declined jurisdiction
over the treaty-based claims, holding that:
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The MFN provision of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT cannot be interpreted as
providing consent to submit a dispute ... to ICSID arbitration and that the
Claimant cannot rely on dispute settlement provisions in other BITs to
which Bulgaria is a Contracting Party in the present case.197
The tribunal reasoned its finding stating that:

[t]he 'context' may support the Claimant's interpretation since the MFN
provision is set forth amongst the Treaty's provisions relating to
substantive investment protection. However, the context alone, in light of
the other elements of interpretation considered herein, does not persuade
the Tribunal that the parties intended such an interpretation. And the
Tribunal has no evidence before it of the negotiating history of the BIT to
convince it otherwise.198
Based on that, the tribunal understood the Treaty’s provisions to be insufficient
with regard to the parties’ intention; thus, it tried to find other evidence from the
case circumstances that supported its conclusion that the parties had no intention
of extending the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions. First, the tribunal
asserted that Bulgaria, at the time of concluding the BIT, tended to enter into
“bilateral investment treaties with limited protections for foreign investors and
with very limited dispute resolution provisions”.199 Second, the tribunal
concluded that the parties’ intention to apply the MFN clause on dispute
settlement provision does not exist by asserting that:

Bulgaria and Cyprus negotiated a revised version of their BIT in 1998.
The negotiations failed but specifically contemplated a revision of the
dispute settlement provisions ....It can be inferred from these negotiations
that the Contracting Parties to the BIT themselves did not consider that the
MFN provision extends to dispute settlement provisions in other BITs.200

197

Plama Decision, supra note 153, ¶ 227, at 756.
Plama Decision, supra note 153, ¶192, at 750-751.
199
Plama Decision, supra note 153, ¶196, at 751.
198

200

Plama Decision, supra note 153, ¶195, at 751.

50

The tribunal went further and emphasized its view regarding the importance of
parties’ intention to apply the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions
quoting that the “Maffezini interpretation went beyond what State Parties to BITs
generally intended to achieve by an MFN provision in a bilateral or multilateral
investment treaty.”201

It is worth noting that the question raised in Salini differs from that in Plama. In
Salini, the treaty provided for Jordan’s consent to ICSID jurisdiction over BIT
claims, but clearly opted out of contractual claims from its consent; in Plama
however, no consent to ICSID jurisdiction was made by Bulgaria in the BIT.

In Wintershall v. The Argentine Republic, the claimant, a German company,
alleged that the measures taken by the Argentinean government during the period
of its financial crisis, which started in 2001, infringed on the interests of the
claimant’s local subsidiary company and with these measures, Argentina had
breached its BIT with Germany. Article 10 of Germany-Argentine BIT provides
that certain requirements have to be fulfilled before resorting to arbitration, i.e.
the dispute must be raised before domestic courts for an 18-month period.202
However, the Claimant did not comply with Article 10 and instead it brought the
dispute before ICSID relying on Article 3 of the Germany-Argentine BIT
concerning the MFN clause203 in order to invoke the application of the dispute
201
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Germany-Argentine BIT, article 10 states that: “(2) If a dispute within the meaning of paragraph 1
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resolution provisions stipulated in Article VII of Argentine-US BIT, which does
not necessitate the 18-month requirement.

The tribunal found that the requirements set forth in the basic BIT in the dispute
settlement clause i.e. attempts for amicable settlement and proceedings before
national courts, before resorting to arbitration, are preliminary and fundamental
requirements that must be followed before resorting to arbitration. It also provided
that the MFN clause cannot be invoked to encompass dispute settlement
provisions, unless it clearly stipulates so. It asserted that:

That the eighteen-month requirement of a proceeding in a local court
constitutes a necessary preliminary step to an ICSID arbitration under the
Argentina-Germany BIT is apparent from the text of Article 10 itself…. In
the ICSID system, “consent” of the Host State to international arbitration
is given – not generally, but inter alia under a particular investment treaty.
The Host-State’s “consent” is given when a bilateral investment treaty is
concluded with another State. The Claimant’s contention that since
Argentina has already consented to ICSID arbitration in Article 10 of the
Argentina-Germany BIT, the invocation by the Claimant of the MFN
provisions of Article 3 of the said BIT (an invocation made to enable the
Claimant to get direct access to international arbitration) would not
involve any issue of jurisdiction, or of consent to arbitration of the Host
State, is plainly erroneous; because as from the very moment that the
MFN clause is so invoked by the Claimant on a jurisdictional ground (i.e.
to enable the Claimant to invoke Article VII of the Argentina-US BIT in
lieu of” Article 10 of the Argentina-Germany BIT) the question of the
Host State’s “consent” (or lack of it) to an alternate jurisdiction clause (in
a different BIT) arises.204
The tribunal asserts that state consent to use a certain mechanism for dispute
resolution must be explicit and leave no doubts. In addition, this requirment does

investments in its territory, to treatment less favourable than it accords to its own nationals or companies or
to nationals or companies of any third State. (3) Such treatment shall not include privileges which may be
extended by either Contracting Party to nationals or companies of third States on account of its membership
in a customs or economic union, common market or free trade area. (4) The treatment under this article
shall not extend to privileges accorded by a Contracting Party to nationals or companies of a third State by
virtue of an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation or other tax agreements.”
204
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not exist when the MFN provision does not “unequivocaly” stipulate procedural
provisions.205 It assured the distinction between the use of the MFN clause to
accord the best treatment provided in a third treaty and to rely on it in order to
avoid procedural requirments, unless this reliance is explicitly stipulated in the
basic treaty.206

Furthermore, the tribunal referred to the exception mentioned in the Maffezini
award mentioning that an investor is not allowed, based on the MFN clause, to
bring a dispute before a different forum that is not provided for in the basic
treaty.207 It concluded that the dispute resolution method invoked by the investor
in accordance with the provisions of the Argentine-USA BIT in lieu of the
provisions of the basic treaty that is the Germany-Argentine BIT is inadmissible.

C. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Having explained some of the inconsistent awards concerning the scope of
application of the MFN clause to procedural matters, it is important now to shed
light on the cases sharing the same basic BIT, comparator BIT, and dealing with
the same subject matter. These two cases are Siemens v. Argentina and Daimler
Financial Services AG v Argentine Republic. Both cases share the same basic BIT
that is Germany-Argentine BIT208 and invoke the same comparator BIT that is
Chile-Argentine BIT.209 Both Claimants are indeed German investors and the
Respondent state is The Argentine Republic.

This analysis necessitates the examination of the legal reasoning of the tribunals
in order to be able to detect the points of divergence between the two reasonings
that led to different decisions. Afterwards, we can test the hypothesis of the paper
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in determining whether there is a correlation between the members of the
tribunals in the two cases and their legal reasoning or not. This section aims at
analyzing the legal reasoning of the tribunal in both cases and tackles the points of
divergence that resulted in different outcomes. First, it starts with analyzing how
the tribunal in Siemens case interpreted the provisions of the Germany-Argentine
BIT and the reasons behind its conclusion that the wording of the MFN clause
could be interpreted to circumvent the procedural requirements in the basic treaty;
thus, upholding the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Second, it analyzes how the
tribunal in the Daimler case used different interpretative arguments of the same
BIT to reach its final decision in order to shed light on the discrepancy between
the tribunals’ decisions in the two cases.

1. Siemens v. Argentine
In Siemens v. Argentine, the Tribunal started its analysis by interpreting the
provisions of the treaty concerning the MFN clause in Germany-Argentine BIT
pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT),210 and stated:

Both parties have based their arguments on the interpretation of the Treaty
inaccordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. This Article
provides that a treaty be“interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.” The Tribunal will adhere to these
rules of interpretation in considering the disputed provisions of the
Treaty... .
Among the interpretations contained in Article 31 of the VCLT,211 is the one that
considers the object and purpose of the treaty. In doing so, the tribunal went
beyond the contextual interpretation of the treaty; it looked at the objective and
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purpose of the treaty through interpreting the preamble and the title of the
treaty.212 It provides that:

The Tribunal considers that the Treaty has to be interpreted neither
liberally norrestrictively, as neither of these adverbs is part of Article
31(1) of the Vienna Convention. The Tribunal shall be guided by the
purpose of the Treaty as expressed in its title and preamble. It isa treaty
“to protect” and “to promote” investments. The preamble provides that the
parties have agreed to the provisions of the Treaty for the purpose of
creating favorable conditions for theinvestments of nationals or companies
of one of the two States in the territory of the other State. Both parties
recognize that the promotion and protection of these investments by a
treaty maystimulate private economic initiative and increase the wellbeing of the peoples of bothcountries. The intention of the parties is clear.
It is to create favorable conditions forinvestments and to stimulate private
initiative.
It went further by indicating that such propose and object shall prevail over the
text of the treaty. Therefore, we can say that the tribunal’s approach in
interpreting the scope of application of the MFN clause was based on the
objective approach; the word “treatment” in the BIT shall be envisaged to contain
all substantial and procedural rights of foreign investors. In light of this, the
tribunal adopted the approach that the dispute resolution mechanism is
inextricably linked to the treatment accorded to investors; hence, the provisions of
dispute settlement shall be interpreted in a way that protects the rights of foreign
investors. It assures that the word “treatment” does not refer, in any way, to
substantive rights only; and thus, it shall envisage the procedural matters too.213 It
provided that:

]…[Treatment” in its ordinary meaning refers to behavior in respect of an
entity or a person. The term “treatment” is neither qualified nor described
except by the expression “not less favorable”. The term “activities” is
equally general. The need for exceptions confirms the generality of the
meaning of treatment or activities rather than setting limits beyond what is
212
213
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said in the exceptions…. When the parties meant to provide an outright
limitation by way of an exception they have done so in paragraphs (3) and
(4) of Article 3 and in the Protocol in relation to security measures or
taxation privileges of nationals or national companies. If it were the
intention to limit the content of Article 3 beyond the limits of those
exceptions, then the terms “treatment” or “activities” would have been
qualified. The fact that this is not the case is an indication of their intended
wide scope. Treatment in Article 3 refers to treatment under the Treaty in
general and not only under that article.
It justified its position by stating that the dispute resolution mechanism is an
integral part of the treatment accorded to foreign investors, their investments, and
all other benefits accorded in light of the MFN clause.214

In the same vein, the tribunal did not favor the application of the principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that mentioning one thing
means the exclusion of another. The tribunal affirmed that it could not limit the
scope of treatment received by the investor, according to the MFN clause, to the
substantive treatments only unless otherwise expressly agreed by the parties.215It
said:

The Tribunal feels bound, in its interpretation of the Treaty, by the
expressed intention of the parties to promote investments and create
conditions favorable to them. The Tribunal finds that when the intention of
the parties has been clearly expressed, it is not in its power to secondguess their intentions by attributing special meaning to phrases based on
whether they were or were not part of a model draft. As already noted, the
term “treatment” is so general that the Tribunal cannot limit its application
except as specifically agreed by the parties. In fact, the purpose of the
MFN clause is to eliminate the effect of specially negotiated provisions
unless they have been excepted. It complements the undertaking of each
State Party to the Treaty not to apply measures discriminatory to
investments under Article 2.

214
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We can conclude that the tribunal grounded its interpretations, and hence its final
decision on jurisdiction, on the vagueness of the MFN provision so that it can
extend its application to the procedural matters that are not expressly excluded in
the treaty.

Furthermore, the tribunal’s decision, in stating that the dispute resolution
mechanism is inextricably intertwined with the protection of foreign investors and
thus can be invoked under the scope of the MFN clause, is misleading. This is
because the fundamental requirement, stated in Article 10 of the GermanyArgentine BIT, is a mandatory prerequisite to resorting to international
arbitration. To illustrate, the tribunal allowed the German investor to select the
most favorable treatment in the Chile BIT that he wished to incorporate and
abandon others in the basic treaty without the consent of the other contracting
party that is the Argentine Republic. The consent of contracting parties to
international arbitration in the Germany-Argentine BIT is in fact a unilateral offer
to arbitrate a group of specific potential claims of a group of putative investors
pursuant to the provisions of the BIT. When an investor decides to initiate
arbitration against the host state through invoking its prior consent to the investorstate arbitration clause in the BIT, the former must have accepted the terms of that
unilateral offer in its entirety. The tribunal here did not recognize the 18-month
waiting period before local courts as an exhaustion of local remedies clause that
mandates the prior recourse to domestic courts before initiating international
arbitration. However, it analyzes the waiting period as one of the steps that the
Claimant is allowed to circumvent using the most favored nation clause in the
Chile BIT.

In addition, the tribunal rejected Argentine’s argument that if Siemens is to import
the application of MFN clause from the Chile-Argentine BIT, it should do so
regarding not only the advantageous clauses, but also the disadvantageous clauses
including the fork in the road provision, which does not exist in the Germany57

Argentine BIT.216 The tribunal highlighted that the MFN clause cannot be
derogated as a whole package, or this would negate the benefit of its
application.217 It stipulates:

The disadvantages may have been a trade-off for the claimed advantages.
However, this is not the meaning of an MFN clause. As its own name
indicates, it relates only to more favorable treatment. There is also no
correlation between the generality of the application of a particular clause
and the generality of benefits and disadvantages that the treaty concerned
may include. Even if the MFN clause is of a general nature, its application
will be related only to the benefits that the treaty of reference may grant
and to the extent that benefits are perceived to be such……. the Tribunal
concludes that the Claimant may limit the application of the Chile BIT to
direct access to international arbitration. Therefore, there is no further
need to consider the allegations of the parties on the fork-in-the-road
provision of the Chile BIT or the nature of the jurisdictions referred to in
the Treaty and the Chile BIT.
Therefore, apparently, the fact that whether the treatment, in its entirety, given to
the Chilean investors pursuant to the dispute resolution clause in the ChileArgentine BIT was more favorable to the treatment given to German investors in
accordance with Germany-Argentine BIT was not the main concern of the
tribunal. However, it successfully allowed the claimant to mix and match the
benefits that could be integrated from the Chile-Argentine BIT to the GermanyArgentine BIT without worrying about any other disadvantages that the former
treaty might envisage. The tribunal allegedly did so for the sake of harmonization
of the dispute resolution mechanisms accorded to all investors in Argentina’s
BIT.218 However, the tribunal’s position in this regard opened the door for
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potential claimants to mix and match different dispute resolution provisions using
various BITs, in order to meet their circumstances.219

The previous analysis emphasizes that the provisions of the arbitration agreement
in a given BIT shall suffice for the objective ascertainment at the time of its
finalization. This is only achievable when the jurisdiction of the tribunal is
defined in accordance with only the basic treaty and without any references to a
comparator treaty. When considering this consensual nature of an arbitration
agreement, it is illogical to ascertain the significant nature of arbitration after the
tribunal determines which most favorable jurisdictional clause from a comparator
treaty could be incorporated based on the request of the investor.

2. Daimler v. Argentine220
On the other side, in Daimler v. Argentine, the tribunal took a different
interpretative approach in deciding whether the MFN clause provided in the
Germany-Argentine BIT could be invoked by the claimant in order to circumvent
the application of the dispute resolution mechanism in Article 10(2)(3),221 and
apply the mechanism provided in the Chile-Argentine BIT. The tribunal started its
analysis by demonstrating its interpretative approach according to public
international law. In this, it started by emphasizing that no one can presume a
state’s consent to a dispute resolution mechanism, but it shall be established with
“affirmative evidence.” The tribunal stated that since BITs are mutual agreements
between two contracting states that aim at protecting and promoting foreign
investments, it can only do so according to the framework that is agreed upon
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between the two state parties.222 This mutual agreement balances both parties’
interests; and hence, the importance of the dispute resolution provisions. It said:

It is in this context that the exact wording of dispute resolution clauses
plays a key role, as such clauses are one of the privileged places where the
imbalances between the interests of both parties are often precisely
defined as a result of the treaty’s negotiation process.223
Furthermore, it stated that only states can decide their best interest and know how
to protect and promote investments and express this intention in their treaties. The
way to examine such intentions is through the text of the treaty. It stated: “The
texts of the treaties they conclude are the definitive guide as to how they have
chosen to do so.”224 Therefore, the tribunals are only responsible for discovering
the meaning of the expressed intentions and not creating a new one. It provides
that in doing so the tribunal must stick to the interpretation that is deemed more
consistent with the object and purpose of the Germany-Argentine BIT.

It stated that consent is the “cornerstone of all international treaty
commitments.”225 Therefore, it is applicable consistently to all states’
commitments under a treaty whether procedural or substantive. In doing so, the
tribunal contended that the interpretation of the MFN clause shall neither be
construed restrictively, nor expansively. In the same vein, the interpretation of the
dispute resolution provision in a given treaty shall not, in all circumstances,
“exceed” the parties’ consent as expressly stated in the treaty.226 It stipulated:

Thus, the fact that dispute resolution clauses should be construed neither
liberally nor restrictively does not authorize international tribunals to
interpret such clauses in a manner which exceeds the consent of the
222
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contracting parties as expressed in the text. To go beyond those bounds
would be to act ultra vires.
Despite the lack of the word “consent” from Article 31 of the VCLT, the Article
referrers to “good faith,” which is construed as limitations to the interpretation to
be restricted to the mutually agreed framework between the parties to a treaty. 227
It provided that:

While the article does not explicitly mention consent, the reference to
“good faith” nevertheless reinforces the duty of tribunals to limit
themselves to interpretations falling within the bounds of the framework
mutually agreed to by the contracting state parties. As stated by the
International Law Commission in its commentary to the draft version of
Article 31, the requirement of interpretation in good faith “flows directly
from the rule pacta sunt servanda.
Consequently, it demonstrates that the existence of states’ consent cannot be
presumed but shall always be expressed in its declaration either via an express
declaration of consent or on the grounds of “acts conclusively establishing” it.228
No divergence shall be drawn between the given expression of the consent and its
scope of application, as allegedly mentioned in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Charles Brower.229 It said:

This distinction is a red herring. If the interpretive analysis reveals that the
scope of Argentina’s consent to submit to the jurisdiction of an
international arbitral tribunal does not extend to the matter at hand, it is
difficult to understand in what sense the State’s consent to submit to that
jurisdiction will have nevertheless been “established” on the basis of the
State’s mere signature and ratification of the Treaty. The relevant
questions not whether the Treaty was ratified – which it was – but what
precisely the States consented to in ratifying the Treaty.230
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In light of the above, the tribunal scrutinized Article (10) concerning the dispute
resolution mechanism and Article (3) that deals with the MFN clause in the
Germany-Argentine BIT. First, the tribunal asserted that the wording of Article 10
and the continuous use of the word “shall” express an obligation upon the parties
to follow the requirements stated in this article in sequence. Adding that, if the
parties intend to entail optional steps, they would have substituted the word
“shall’ with more flexible terms like “may”. Thus, the current text of the Article
reflects their intention that such requirements are mandatory and to be followed in
sequence for the tribunal to have jurisdiction over the dispute.231

As for whether the 18-month waiting period is a mere admissibility issue or is a
substantive jurisdictional prerequisite, the tribunal held that such requirement is a
jurisdictional matter, the lack of which results in a lack of tribunal’s jurisdiction.
It found that all dispute resolution provisions are jurisdictional in nature in all
treaties.232 Therefore, the jurisdictional issue of the 18-months period cannot be
waived.233 It said that “Since the 18-month domestic courts provision constitutes a
treaty based pre-condition to the Host State’s consent to arbitrate, it cannot be
bypassed or otherwise waived by the Tribunal asa mere “procedural” or
“admissibility-related” matter.”

The second issue relates to the MFN clause. This issue entails two aspects: the
timing of the standing of the MFN clause and the scope of its interpretation. As to
the first aspect, the tribunal emphasized that the claimant, under the GermanyArgentine BIT, should have exhausted the prerequisite requirement of the local
courts’ waiting period prior to invoking the application of the MFN clause in
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order to maintain its legal standing before the current tribunal. By not doing this,
the current tribunal has no jurisdiction over the current case.234 It said:

]...[these two conclusions suggest that a claimant wishing to raise an MFN
claim under the German-Argentine BIT – whether on procedural or
substantive grounds – lacks standing to do so until it has fulfilled the
domestic courts provison. To put it more concretely, since the Claimant
has not yet satisfied the necessary condition precedent to Argentina’s
consent to international arbitration, its MFN arguments are not yet
properly before the Tribunal. The Tribunal is therefore presently without
jurisdiction to rule on any MFN-based claims unless the MFN clauses
themselves supply the Tribunal with the necessary jurisdiction.
Turning to the second aspect, which is the tribunal’s interpretation of the scope of
application of the MFN clause, it observed the existence of three MFN provisions
stipulated in Article 3, Article 4 of the Germany-Argentine BIT, and Article 3 of
the Protocol. It stated that Article 3 of the BIT has the most general MFN
clause.235 Article 4 deals with substantive protections only and is more limited
than Article 3,236 and Article 3 of the Protocol illustrates the suitable
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interpretation of Article 3.237 The tribunal pointed out that the three provisions use
the word “treatment” without giving any explicit definition for it. Therefore, it is
the duty of the tribunal to interpret in “good faith” the ordinary meaning of these
texts in accordance with the object and purpose of the BIT in order to determine
whether the MFN clause can embrace both substantive and procedural matters or
is restricted to substantive protection only. It stated that, while the treaty did not
specify what is meant by the word “treatment” anywhere, the word was used 13
times in the whole treaty. Thus, the tribunal must attempt to interpret the word in
accordance with Article 31(4) of the VCLT.238

It emphasizes that it is not

concerned with the debate about how the term “treatment” shall be understood;
whether it shall be previewed to comprise substantive treatment only, or it shall
encompass procedural matters as well, but it is only concerned is about how the
term is interpreted.239 In this, it emphasizes that: “What matters is not how the
general term treatment potentially could or “should” be interpreted but rather
what meaning the Contracting State Parties to the specific Treaty in question have
attached to the term.”

In interpreting the term, the tribunal started by adopting the principle of
contemporaneity. This principle requires that the term “treatment” shall be
defined in accordance with the time of negotiations of the BIT between Germany
and Argentine, which was 1991.240 It observed that in 1991 the difference
between contract claims and treaty claims remained incomprehensible and that the
237
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dispute resolution clauses were perceived, mainly, under the umbrella of the
international contracts. This was accompanied by the perception that these
provisions are independent from the contract and for protecting the investor’s
rights in initiating arbitration proceedings if the host state revokes the contract.241
It also considered the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct
Investments of 1992. These Guidelines provide that the term treatment is meant to
encompass distinct principles of conduct applicable to the host state in order to
safeguard the “investment” from any discriminatory measures in the territory of
the host state.242 It declared that these Guidelines lack any references to the
international dispute settlements in the section concerning the term “treatment”;
however, it was mentioned in a separate section. This suggests that both the term
“treatment” and the international dispute resolution were not interrelated at that
time. Therefore, the tribunal concluded that the term “treatment” was, most
probably, meant to encompass the direct treatment of the host states of the
investment and not to international arbitration settlements.243 Despite stressing
that these guidelines cannot be determinative, they provide an indication of the
predominant view among states at that time, which is the period contemporaneous
with the conclusion of the BIT between Germany and Argentine.

Furthermore, the tribunal provides that other indicators directed to the same
interpretation of the Guidelines. First, the obligation of the most favored treatment
was restricted to the treatment of the host state within its territory. Such territorial
restriction is incompatible with the application of the MFN clause to international
arbitration resolution.244 It noted:

Where an MFN clause applies only to treatment in the territory of the Host
State, the logical corollary is that treatment outside the territory of the
Host State does not fall within the scope of the clause..... The Host State’s
241
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obligation extends no further than providing the covered investor with
“treatment” in respect of domestic dispute resolution (aka dispute
resolution “in its territory”) that is no less favorable investors than the
domestic dispute resolution treatment provided to third-State investors.
The tribunal pointes out the critical significance of the territorial limitation. It
elaborates that the provision of the investor-state dispute settlement in the host
state’s national courts establishes an activity that shall take place in its territory.245
Thus, the tribunal reasoned its position by saying that should a state give a foreign
investor of a third state more-favorable-treatment under the auspices of its
national courts, this is deemed a breach of the MFN clause. However, this shall
not be invoked in the context of international arbitration, as it takes place outside
the host state’s territory. One important consequence is that if we assume, in
arguendo, that the investor-state dispute settlement provision is envisaged under
the term “treatment” in a given BIT, the MFN clause in the Germany-Argentine
BIT shall only be applicable to the dispute resolution before national courts.246
The tribunal noted that if we concluded otherwise, this would result in a
disregarding of the territorial limitations specified in the BIT wording “in its
territory” and hence would not be consistent with the interpretation provided for
in the VCLT that involves, inter alia, the interpretation of the treaty’s terms “shall
be done in accordance with their context.”247 It held that:

The present Tribunal therefore holds that the Treaty’s clearly expressed
territorial limitation upon the scope of its MFN clauses establishes that the
Contracting State Parties to the Germany Argentine BIT did not intend for
the Treaty’s extra-territorial dispute resolution provisions to fall within the
scope of those clauses.
Furthermore, the tribunal found that there is no supporting evidence as to whether
the word treatment encompasses the investors only or includes investments as
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well. It notes that the several provisions of the MFN in the BIT apply differently
to investments and investors. It, however, denies that any of the MFN provisions
was meant to encompass international dispute settlements.248

In addition, the tribunal ascertained that the MFN clause encompasses the term
treatment rather than “all matters”, as alleged in Maffezini v. Spain case.249 It
refused to adopt the idea that the insertion of the term “all matters” instead of the
term “treatment” would lead to the application of the MFN clause to the dispute
settlement clause. It elaborates that “all matters cannot refer to all matters,”
because provisions concerning the territorial and temporal application of a BIT
can never be extended under the scope of the MFN clause. 250 It concluded that the
absence of the term “all matters” in the basic BIT indicates that both state parties
to the BIT intended to distinguish between the treatment of the host state to
investments in its territory and the international arbitration provision and such
consequence is consistent with the aforementioned tribunal’s findings.251

With respect to the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the tribunal
rejected to rely on it in this case. It noted that the expression of the standard
exceptions in Article 3 and 4 in the Germany-Argentine BIT does not indicate the
intention of the state parties to include the international dispute resolution
mechanism under the scope of the MFN clause. This is because the MFN
exceptions provided in the BIT refer exclusively to treatment carried out under the
host state’s territory. In addition, it noted that all exceptions that were given in
connection with the application of the MFN clause prior to Maffezini case, dealt
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with the host state’s treatment of investments and not the international settlement
of disputes that arose from such treatment.252 It said:

Overlooking the obvious differences between rights and remedies would
seem to push the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius too far.
One cannot use the principle to prove the non existence of apples based
upon the existence of oranges. The exclusion of certain types of domestic
substantive treatment from the German-Argentine BIT’s Article 3 MFN
clauses therefore does not imply the inclusion of particular types of extraterritorial dispute resolution procedures.
Afterwards, the tribunal rejected the arguments that the dispute resolution
mechanism provided for in the Chile-Argentine BIT is, in fact, more favorable to
the German investor.253 The tribunal, in conclusion, decided that it lacks
jurisdiction over the case; MFN provisions of the Germany-Argentine BIT cannot
be used to circumvent the mandatory prerequisite conditions stipulated in Article
10 of the BIT and that the international dispute resolution provision does not
necessarily indicate a more favorable treatment to the claimant.

3. Summary
In literature, there is an approach that both parties must express their consent to
arbitration in order for the tribunal to have jurisdiction. Without having an explicit
consent of the state to directly arbitrate with foreign investors through the
application of the MFN clause, the MFN provision cannot be invoked to establish
the jurisdiction of the tribunal.254 In fact, this is where we can determine the
intention of the parties because it exposes whether the manifestation of such
consent is expressed within the language of the MFN provision or not. Moreover,
252
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since the wording of every MFN clause shall ultimately determines the scope of
its application, every MFN clause is, in itself, a promise of specific treatment.

The foregoing analysis reveals that despite applying the same interpretative
analysis in the two cases, there are many points of divergence between the two
tribunals’ reasoning that led to different findings. The first issue relates to the
consent of the state to the dispute settlement provision. The second issue relates to
whether considering the waiting period in the Germany-Argentine BIT is a
mandatory step before resorting to international arbitration and thus, can be
deemed an exhaustion of local remedies, or considering it as one of the many
steps provided in Article 10 that can be waived through invoking a more
favorable dispute settlement provision from the Chile-Argentine BIT. The third
issue relates to the interpretation of the word “treatment” mentioned in the
Germany-Argentine BIT.

As illustrated above, the tribunal in Siemens was not persuaded with the
importance of state’s consent to deviate from the dispute resolution provision in
the BIT and perceived its consent from the BIT in its entirety including the MFN
clause. This led to the conclusion that such a requirement is subject to the state’s
consent provided when concluding the BIT. From my point of view, this finding
is incorrect. It is well established that the consent of two parties must match in
order to invoke a dispute resolution mechanism. To illustrate, the prior consent of
the state that was given at the time of the signing of the BIT must meet the
subsequent consent of the investor that is given by initiating the arbitration.255
However, in Siemens the consent did not match. To put it simply, the claimant
had not fulfilled the requirements stipulated in Article 10, which is the offer of the
state to arbitrate. However, the claimant here made a counter-offer to the state’s
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offer to arbitrate. Such a counteroffer lacks the subsequent consent of the state;
therefore, the tribunal has no jurisdiction here.

Furthermore, the tribunal refused to consider the requirement of the 18-month
waiting period as an exhaustion of local remedies that is a mandatory prerequisite
in holding the jurisdiction of the tribunal and declared that it is a mere step that
can be circumvented upon the application of the MFN clause.

Finally, the tribunal emphasized that the word “treatment” in the BIT shall be
interpreted to envisage all substantial and procedural rights of foreign investors. It
assured that the word “treatment” does not refer to substantive rights only; and
thus, it shall envisage the procedural matters too. Thus, the tribunal found that
albeit there might be an absence of any reference to ‘all matters’ under the BIT,
the MFN provision could extend to encompassing the international dispute
settlement provisions.256 Accordingly, the tribunal adopted the approach that the
dispute resolution mechanism is inextricably linked to the treatment accorded to
investors; hence, the provisions of dispute settlement shall be interpreted in a way
that protects the rights of foreign investors.

The tribunal’s reasoning and interpretation is misleading. When a treaty mandates
the investor to resort to domestic courts for a specific period of time before
bringing its claims before international arbitration, whereas another treaty
concluded by the respondent does not specify such a requirement, it is not hard to
conclude that all putative claimants would favor the latter treaty. Moreover, the
tirubnal here overrode the intention of the parties established in the dispute
resolution provision of Article 10 of the basic BIT with the wider application of
the MFN clause as adopted in Maffezini, notwithstanding the limited wording of
the MFN clause in the Germany-Argentine BIT. This decision was unfairly
favorable to the foreign investor, as it disregarded the actual intention of the
256
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Argentine Republic regarding the dispute settlement clause. In sum, the tribunal
disregarded the state’s consent to the sequential dispute resolution mechanism and
overrode its sovereignty by importing the dispute resolution clause from the
Chile-Argentine BIT pursuant to the MFN provision in the basic treaty.

Conversely, the majority of the tribunal in Daimler had a different interpretation.
With reference to the consent, the majority of the tribunal strongly agreed that the
existence of states’ consent can never be presumed, it is established either via an
express declaration of consent or on the grounds of “acts conclusively
establishing” it. It is logical to apply the principle of contemporaneity when
tempting to analyze the state parties’ intention at the time of negotiating the BIT.
The consent of Argentina is clearly expressed in Article 10 of the BIT and it
reflects the requirements of public international law with regard to the dispute
resolution mechanism adopted in this Article. In sum, the tribunal found that it is
the choice of states to choose the dispute resolution mechanism that they prefer in
their BITs and this choice must not be enforced against their wishes.

In addition, the tribunal was concerned with the correct interpretation of the term
“treatment” rather than considering whether it encompasses substantial and
procedural matters, makes sense in this regard. Furthermore, the territorial
limitation specified in the Germany-Argentine BIT cannot be bypassed as it is
connected to state sovereignty. This means that, assuming, in arguendo, that the
MFN scope is broad enough to encompass the dispute resolution mechanism, it
shall be applied within the territory of Argentina pursuant to the territorial
limitation stipulated in Article 2.257
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Finally, the tribunal emphasized that the 18-month period stipulated in Article 10
of the BIT represents a mandatory jurisdictional condition that has to be fulfilled
prior to initiating international arbitration. It is well established that dispute
resolution provisions constitute jurisdictional matters, the lack of which result in
the lack of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the 18-month period condition
cannot be bypassed.

In conclusion, it can never be possible for a tribunal that expansively interprets
the treatment accorded to an investor, pursuant to a BIT, to encompass the
procedural provisions of another treaty by invoking the MFN clause, without
knowing that such a tribunal is favoring investors’ rights over what might be the
actual intentions of the parties when drafting the treaty.

Having said that, it is significant now to reveal the members of each tribunal in
light of their foregoing decisions. The two party-appointed arbitrators were the
same in both cases Siemens and Daimler. In Siemens, the president of the tribunal
was Andres Rigo Sureda who was appointed as president of the tribunal in
National Grid Pic v. The Argentine Republic.258 In this case, the tribunal also
adopted an expansive approach in interpreting the scope of the MFN clause. The
other members of the tribunal in Siemens is Judge Charles Brower as co-arbitrator
for the claimant and Professor Bello Janiero as co-arbitrator for Argentina. In
Daimler, the two party-appointed arbitrators were the same as Siemens, but with
Professor Pierre-Marrie Dupuy acting as president of the tribunal. Judge Brower
was also the claimant appointed arbitrator in the ICSID Case of Hochtief v.
Argentine, which rendered, by the majority, the same conclusion as the one
reached in Siemens, with Professor Christopher Thomas dissenting the majority’s
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decision.259 However, in Daimler, and as mentioned above, the majority of the
tribunal decided that it lacked jurisdiction because the MFN did not permit the
claimant to access the international dispute resolution provision in the comparator
BIT. Judge Brower, however, dissent to this decision expressing his disagreement
with the majority analysis of the MFN clause. Moreover, Professor Bello Janeiro
expressed in his separate opinion how he changed his opinion from the decision
unanimously rendered in Siemens. It is worth mentioning that the decision of the
tribunal in Daimler was decided consistently with the decision rendered in ICS
Inspection and Control Services Ltd v. Argentine of which Professor Pierre-Marie
Dupuy acted also as president of the tribunal.260

The foregoing examination of the members of the tribunals shows, to some extent,
that the tribunals’ interpretations of the same subject matter may be altered in
connection with their policy preferences and their ideologies. Despite no concrete
evidence to support this hypothesis, the aforementioned analysis of the two cases
detects the inconsistency of the tribunals’ interpretation that correlate with their
intrinsic ideologies. This tendency does not reach the threshold of disqualification
of the arbitrators and thus cannot be a ground for a challenge. However, the
question of how we can solve this problem of ideological bias remains open.

D. CONCLUSION
With all the foregoing diversity of approaches, it is acceptable to say that there is
a number of inconclusive evidence of the existence of potential bias in
international investment arbitration. Empirical analysis and detection cannot deal
with this type of bias in a particular case. Even though, on a systematic level, any
empirical analysis is deemed as an attempt to test the bias, but not how to deal
with it.261 We can say that tribunals usually adopt an expansive approach when
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they tend to favor the foreign investors. By doing so, they boost the compensatory
promise of the investment arbitration regime in the interest of foreign investors,
while endangering the sovereignty of states through risking their liabilities.262
The foregoing results tested the hypothesis that arbitrators tend to interpret the
law in the direction that will fit their ideologies and policy preferences. This
implies that arbitrators’ decisions, when deciding upon a controversial issue,
might be, to a great extent, influenced by their ideologies or policy preferences.

Having said that, we can summarize this chapter by saying that, in the analysis of
arbitrator’s decisions, which concerns contested issues, there is tentative support
of bias derived from his/her ideologies and policy preferences because of the
asymmetrical structure of the claims in the system and the lack of conventional
indicators of his/her independence. Therefore, we have to adopt a precautionary
approach through which we can limit the risk of actual bias in investment
arbitration. This might be achieved through establishing an adjudicative system
that adopts institutional safeguards in order to limit any perceived bias emanating
from the structure of the system itself. For this reason, it is important to assess the
reform proposals addressed to the problem of independence and impartiality to
the ITA system and its adjudicators. Such proposals are discussed in the
subsequent chapter.
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IV.

REFORM PROPOSALS

In ITA and during the past few years, there is a clash between arbitrators’
ideologies and the interests of the parties. The clash has arisen between the private
interests to protect foreign investments that has been the main concern of
investment treaties and the interests of the sovereign states to exercise their
regulatory powers in order to ensure the protection of public welfare. The surge in
investment treaty arbitration is both structural and procedural. As discussed in
chapter two, some scholars argue that ICSID arbitration suffers from a critical and
predominant systemic lack of neutrality.263 Other scholars’ views are motivated
by the irreconcilable inconsistency between the independence and impartiality of
the appointment of arbitrators and the systematic nature of the ITA, thus,
magnifying such discrepancy.264 In their analysis, many scholars have concluded
that specific characteristics of the investment treaty arbitration system are
dramatically opposed to independence and impartiality. Accordingly, these
irreconcilable inconsistencies call for systematic reform of the entire ICSID
arbitration system rather than a fractional approach. For instance, Jan Paulsson
argues that the party appointment mechanism contradicts the obligation of
neutrality and thus proposes the abolishment of this mechanism.265 R. Berzero and
G.J. Horvath argue that the double-hatting function of the ICSID arbitrators to act
as arbitrators and counsels at the same time, contradicts the obligation to be
independent and impartial. Hence, they propose the prevention of the dual
function by eliminating potential conflicts.266 This has led to the emergence of
several trials that aim at reconciling these issues. This chapter examines the EU
proposal in the TTIP in establishing an Investment Court System (ICS) as it is
almost fully integrated in the new proposal for establishing the Multilateral
Investment Court (MIC). Following, it assesses such a proposal in light of its
efficiency on the issues of independence and impartiality of the system and
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predicts the failure of this permanent multilateral investment court to curb the
political and procedural issues of the current ITA system.

A. THE ICS PROPOSAL IN TTIP
The EU Commission has attempted to find solutions to the issues facing the ISDS
system as a whole. It proposed the establishment of an investment court system
during the TTIP negotiations.267 The EU Commission held that in order to solve
the ongoing surge in the ITA system there has to be a diametrical reform to the
system and not in one of the applicable rules or procedures. In November 2015,
the EU Commission introduced its proposal for establishing an Investment Court
System (ICS) in lieu of the current ISDS in TTIP and in all future trade and
investment agreement of the EU.268 The EU Commission describes the new twotier ICS as being more “modern, efficient, transparent, and impartial system for
international investment dispute settlement resolution.”269

The proposed amendments concerning the issue of independence and impartiality
includes that, first, it will be constituted of 15 judges; five nationals of EU
member states, five nationals of the United States, and five nationals of third
countries.270 Second, the appointed judges shall be qualified to hold a judicial
office in their home country and to have expertise in international public law,
international investment law, and international trade law.271 Third, judges are not
arbitrators and shall not be selected by the parties to a dispute, rather they shall be
appointed for a fixed term of six years, which can be renewed once. 272 Fourth,
each case shall be constituted of three judges: an EU judge, a U.S. judge, and a
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judge from a third country.273 Fifth, the members of the tribunal and the appellate
tribunal are to be selected from those whose independence is beyond reasonable
doubt and “not affiliated to any government”.274 Sixth, it prohibites the doublehatting role of arbitrators; meaning that a judge before the investment court
cannot act as counsel, expert, or witness in any pending or future investment
disputes including disputes under domestic laws.275 When a party has concerns
about conflict of interest with any of the judges, it shall notify the president of the
tribunal or the president of the appeal tribunal with its challenge notice.276 Finally,
challenges to the president of the tribunal shall be submitted to the president of
the appellate body and vice versa.277

In order to ensure a fair dispute, there has to be solid and effective institutional
safeguards. The EU proposal is attempting to amplify the institutional safeguards
for independence and impartiality of the new ICS in order to ensure a fair
arbitration process. The safeguards proposed by the EU are of a public law nature,
such as security of tenure, selection of arbitrators from a roster, fixed salaries, and
a binding code of conduct. On the one hand, the selection of judges from a roster
or a pre-established list might, to some extent, guarantee an objective way of
assigning disputes without influences from any party on the case’s outcome. In
addition, it also abolishes the party appointment mechanism. This issue is
significant for quality control, accountability, and independence of the system.278
Furthermore, the existence of the security of tenure and the random selection of
judges in cases will undermine the link between parties and judges.
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On the other hand, the EU proposal does not deal with all concerns of
independence and impartiality. First, Article 11 of the draft text of the proposal
does not prohibit judges from acting as arbitrators; it only prohibits judges from
working as counsels, party appointed experts, or witnesses. This means that
judges before the investment court are permitted to act as arbitrators in other
ISDS disputes. Put differently, conflicts of interest could still be invoked as long
as an adjudicator can play the dual role of a judge and an arbitrator at the same
time. Such a double hatting role is irreconcilable with the idea of an independent
court. Therefore, an effective independence and impartiality can only be achieved
when judges are prohibited from doing any external work as arbitrators. Hence
this proposal failed to resolve the problem of double-hatting.

Second, another pitfall in the ICS proposal is that judges’ monthly retainer is still
linked to the duration of the case. To illustrate, judges of the first instance will
earn € 2,000 as a monthly retainer fee and appeal’s judges will earn € 7,000 to
guarantee their permanent availability and availability on short notice in addition
to a fee earned for every day of their work on the case. 279 This underpins the
financial incentive of the judges in the cases. Hence the link between judges and
financial interest has not been undermined.280 Therefore, the EU proposal fails
again here to resolve the moral hazard represented in the adjudicators’ financial
interests with investors to bring more claims.

Third, although the code of conduct, which is applicable to first instance judges
and judges of appeal tribunal281 refers to independence, impartiality,
confidentiality obligations, and maintaining the significance of the independence
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and impartiality of the judges for the integrity of the system, 282 its determination
of the forbidden behavior and relationships is still vague and is not as
comprehensive as the IBA Guidelines. Therefore, it leaves a vast space for
different interpretations. It is worth mentioning that this proposal of the TTIP is
still under negotiations and has not been finalized or entered into force yet.

B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT
COURT (MIC)
Another counter proposal by the EU is the establishment of a Multilateral
Investment Court (MIC) for the settlement of investment disputes. There have
been negotiations concerning its establishment since 2015.283 The aim of the
Commission is to address the criticism of the current ISDS system concerning the
EU trade and investment agreements. The Commission proposes to establish a
permanent and independent MIC that is consistent with its case law and includes
an appeal mechanism. The Commission’s initiative deals with procedural issues
only, as the substantive matter is to be decided in accordance with the underlying
investment agreements that will be applied to the MIC. On March 20, 2018, the
Council of the European Union adopted and issued the negotiating directives for a
Convention establishing the MIC.284 The Council’s directives entails instructions
for the Commission concerning the composition of the court, procedural
safeguards, independence and impartiality, coherence, transparency, effectiveness
demonstrated in the costs and length of procedures, contribution of developing
countries, and the admission of small and medium-sized enterprises and natural
persons.285
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The proposal to establish the MIC is not much different from the ICS proposal in
the draft TTIP discussed earlier. Although there is no final draft articles for the
MIC until now, the ongoing deliberations refer to some of its features. The
Commission aims at conveying the key features of the national courts system into
the international investment world through establishing one international
multilateral court for international investment adjudications. The MIC is to be a
permanent court that has first instance and appeal tribunals;286 secure tenure for a
number of highly qualified judges who are obliged to abide by the strictest ethical
standards; and have transparency and coherence of work. The MIC is a permanent
body for settlement of investment disputes that arise concerning the current and
future investment treaties and only when such treaties explicitly permit an
investor to bring its claims against a state; abolish the party appointed mechanism
of arbitrators; provide enforceability of decisions; and provide for an opt-in
mechanism.287

Further initial talks about the establishment of the MIC started in late 2017 under
the United Nation Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which
mandated its Working Group III to work on the global reform of the current
ISDS. The mandate of the UNCITRAL Working Group III (WGIII) distributes
the present negotiations on MIC among three phases.288 The first phase focused
on addressing the criticism of the current ISDS.289 Phase two addresses the
interest in reforms.290 Phase three deals with the negotiations of such reform.
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They are currently in Phase two including an ongoing deliberations that took
place in Vienna from 29 October to 2 November 2018.291

Concerning the issue of independence and impartiality, it is dealt with in Article
11 of the Directives of the EU Council. It provides that the court shall be
independent. There is a challenge mechanism included in the convention.
Members shall receive permanent remuneration, are appointed for fixed nonrenewable long terms and have secure tenure. They are to be appointed in an
objective and transparent way similar to the method of appointment adopted by
the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. It states
that:

The independence of the Court should be guaranteed. Members of the
Court (both of the tribunal of first instance and of the appeal tribunal)
should be subject to stringent requirements regarding their qualifications
and impartiality. Strong rules on ethics and conflict of interests, including
a code of conduct for the Members of the Court and challenge
mechanisms shall be included in the Convention. The Members of the
Court should receive a permanent remuneration. They should be appointed
for a fixed, long and non-renewable period of time and enjoy security of
tenure, as well as all necessary guarantees of impartiality and
independence. Members should be appointed through an objective and
transparent process. Different methods of appointment of the Members of
the Court should be explored including, for example, the possibility that
all Parties to the Convention are entitled to appoint a Member of the
Court, or the possibility that Members of the Court are appointed through
other methods inspired by existing international courts such as the
International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court, taking
into account, inter alia, the expected size of the Court and the need to
ensure effectiveness and cost-efficiency. Any such method shall ensure
that the Members of the Court who are appointed are of a high quality
with the necessary professional and ethical standing to fulfil their duties.
Any method of appointment of the Members of the Court shall provide
also for regional balance and gender representationin addition to ensuring
the efficient and effective management of the Court. Moreover, Members
291
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should be appointed to hear a particular case by a transparent and
objective method.292
The foregoing texts represent the current negotiations concerning the
independence and impartiality of the new MIC and reveals the drafters intention
to show that they are concerned about the surge in the criticism directed at the
ITA system. However, one must think about whether these drafters are really
resolving the current problems of the ITA or not. Is it a good idea to centralize
such power in one entity? Is it going to properly balance the interests of the
protection of investors with the interests of sovereign states to regulate? In order
to be able to predict the efficiency of the MIC proposal we need to assess the
adequacy of such proposal in resolving the foregoing critiques of the current ITA
system.

C. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT REFORM PROPOSAL
The foregoing proposal to establish an MIC is a red herring. The principal
concern is whether such a proposal will effectively curb the illegitimacy problems
of the current system or not. The second concern is whether such centralization is
better than that characterizing the current ISDS.

First, the dissatisfaction with the current ISDS system flows from the imbalance
between the interests of protecting investments and the interests of host states to
regulate public policies, the perceived bias of arbitrators and their ideological
predisposition in decision making that result in expansive interpretations than
what the states to an agreement have previously agreed upon in their treaty, thus,
curtailing the regulatory functions of those states.

The establishment of a

multilateral investment court would not curb such illegitimacy. The court would
become a tool with a greater authority to wield neoliberal rules that protect
investments and disregard states interests. Many judges of the ICJ act as
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arbitrators in investment arbitrations. An examination of the record of their
decisions does not reveal that they avoid the predispositions of other arbitrators
who have never acted as judges before.293 On the rare occasions when ICJ judges
who come from developing countries have acted as arbitrators in investment
arbitrations, they dissented from the majority’s opinion coming from developed
countries.294 They represent the minority, even assuming in arguendo that those
appointed judges are not acquainted with the neoliberal vision.295 They might still
be well-equipped to comply with the majority opinions.

Moreover, since the EU has made reference to domestic courts judges as models
to follow, one must highlight that Judges of domestic courts are chosen from elite
classes that share the same unified views and in sights.296 For example, it has been
observed that most English judges are male, white, enrolled in the same
universities, and specialized in commercial law.297 Therefore, most of those
judges in a certain court are likely to share the same ideological preferences and
predispositions.298 Judges who are appointed from other EU countries and the
USA. are most probably alike too. Therefore, the likely outcome of establishing
the MIC would be the affirmation of biased tendencies in a more authoritative
manner. Since the ITA is controlled by a small group of persons, such a group
will be promoted to the permanent body of the MIC. Put differently, the oligarchy
in the ITA system will be relocated to an international authoritative body. In this
line, not only will they transmit their ideological preferences to the bench, more
importantly their shared ideologies will be legitimized in the process. Although
the judges of the MIC are to be elected by states, other tribunals that were
constituted in the same manner such as the ICJ suffer from the inherent
293

M. Sornarajah, An International Investment Court: panacea or purgatory?, Columbia FDI Perspectives,
No. 180, August 15 (2016).
294
Abaclat and others v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Judge Abi-Saab’s Dissenting Opinion to
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility August 4 (2011).
295
Supra note 282.
296
Id.
297
Id, at footnote 2.
298
Id.

83

dominance of these courts by judges who have greater legal skills. Needless to
mention, the selection process of the developing countries before international
tribunals has been based on extraneous aspects instead of being based on skills.299
Additionally, there are no indications of the geographical zones those arbitrators
may come from or even the mechanism for their selection criteria.

Second, the existence of a permanent investment court would detach it from the
democratic control of the host states. Like other permanent international courts,
the MIC would arrogate extra powers and establish a new regime of precedents in
investment arbitrations. Some scholars support this idea to constitutionalize the
current international investment law.300 The peril here is that it will amplify the
neoliberal principles to a position that is above and beyond democratic processes.
At present, investment treaty arbitration does not envisage a doctrine of precedent
and thus by establishing a permanent body, the doctrine of precedents will
emerge. The doctrine of precedents in investment arbitration has a dark side
affecting the economic stability of host states. Put differently, the proposal of
establishing a permanent international investment court will constrict further the
sovereignty of states relative to the current ISDS system.301 Usually, states favor
international arbitration because it at least enables them to have some control over
the selection of arbitrators who might consider the states’ regulatory powers to
control public policies, the thing that will be missing from the permanent court.302
Moreover, pursuing consistency through stare decisis might decrease the
accountability of the court to the states and thus harbor a considerable risk to a
state’s economy.303 It may lead to a decline in accuracy because judges would
follow precedents instead of focusing on rendering the right decision in light of

299

M. Sornarajah, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, Cambridge Univ. Press, at 283 (2015) ]hereinafter, Sornarajah, RESISTANCE[.
300
Id.
301
Id, at 263; See also Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53
HARV. INT’L L.J. at 391- 434 (2012).
302
Sornarajah, RESISTANCE, Supra note 288, at 264.
303
Id, at 265.

84

the given merits of the case and thus affecting the quality of decisions.304
Furthermore, the establishment of the MIC will not eliminate the disenchantment
of many developing states with the law in the present ISDS system. It will
perhaps establish procedures aiming at creating consistent interpretation notions
that are significantly unfavorable to maintaining states’ regulatory measures.

Furthermore, since each applicable law is drawn from a different treaty, the
applicable laws are decentralized. Despite alleging that such laws share similar
provisions, different treaties generate different laws due to the textual divergence.
In addition, there is a divergence in the legal reasoning of the decisions. As we
have seen in chapter three of this paper, the different reasoning of the Siemens and
Daimler tribunals led to completely different decisions, despite invoking the same
BIT between Germany and Argentina. This is because tribunals, when using
analogical reasoning to amplify certain issue, employ reasoning derived from a
diversity of inconsistent sources in order to be able to assess claims and
objections in the manner that they see suitable.305 Therefore, if it is perceived that
philosophical attitudes demonstrated in neoliberalism dictate the outcomes in
ITA, such predispositions will become deep-rooted in the permanent international
court and thus these philosophical attitudes will outlast accordingly.306 Therefore,
the establishment of a permanent international investment court would boost the
worst features of the present ITA system.

In conclusion, the EU bilateral attempt with the USA in the TTIP proposing the
establishment of the ICS and its attempt with the UNCITRAL Working Groups to
establish a Multilateral Investment Court is perceived to address ISDS concerns,
inter alia, the independence and impartiality of arbitrators. However, this
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proposal does not solve the problem of the imbalance between the interests of
protection of investments and the interests of the sovereign states to regulate their
public policies and the issue concerning the ideological predisposition of
arbitrators. It also fails to deal with the moral hazard in adjudicating investment
disputes under the current ISDS system, despite examining the issue in the
Working Group sessions. One might say that the new MIC proposal is nothing
more than a replica of the current ISDS system with a new face. This means that
the perceived bias in investment arbitration will still be an open question that
needs to be reformed.
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V.

CONCLUSION

There is a large debate about the legitimacy of the investment treaty arbitration
system as a whole. The system is perceived as being favorable to investors over
host states. This perception is not nonsense because of the general features of the
system, specifically the use of arbitration as a method of adjudication between
sovereign states and private investors and the use of private adjudicators to decide
on public law matters. These two principal features represent the pillars for the
political and procedural problems of the ITA system.

The political criticism addressed to the legitimacy of the system is demonstrated
in the imbalance between state sovereignty and private investors’ property. The
ITA system is criticized because it resolves disputes between states and
individuals as opposed to the regulatory disputes between two reciprocal parties,
i.e. either between individuals or between states. The ITA has changed the
dynamics of sovereign authority of the states through empowering the foreign
investors to bring claims against the state’s regulatory measures before an ad hoc
tribunal of private arbitrators instead of bringing such claims under the state’s
domestic court system. In addition, it endangers the sovereign authority of the
state and submits its budget to the control of private adjudicators. These private
adjudicators are perceived to be biased because of their ideologies and policy
preferences that affect their decision making.

The procedural criticism is elaborated in the mechanism of appointing arbitrators
in investment arbitration. The party appointment mechanism of arbitrators and the
lack of secure tenure creates the moral hazard of arbitrators. Since the parties to
investment arbitration are entitled to select their party appointed arbitrators, and
since investment arbitration is a close-knit network, arbitrators became interested
in future appointments and in increasing their social networking sphere in the
field. Since only investors are entitled to bring claims against host states,
arbitrators adopt approaches that are favorable to foreign investors and best serve
87

their claims over host states. Therefore, the party appointment mechanism and the
problem of the lack of a secure tenure threaten the independence and impartiality
of the arbitrators and thus the legitimacy of the ISDS system as a whole. The issue
of legitimacy is important because once the parties to a dispute contest the
legitimacy of the adjudicators, they lose faith in the fairness of the entire system.

In this paper, it is argued that the problem of the investment treaty arbitration
cannot be resolved by selecting different people, whether through ICSD or any
other institution to have more integrity, as arbitrators. The problem is beyond the
existence of the rogue tribunals or the questionable arbitrator. Despite how a
tribunal cautiously performs in an individual case, the system in its entirety lacks
independence, impartiality, and openness in many vital ways, and most
importantly, it is open to a perception of bias as long as its adjudicators earn their
income from individual appointments.

I examine the reform proposal to establish a permanent multilateral investment
court to deal with the political and procedural criticisms addressed to current
investment arbitration system. I conclude that such proposal does not unravel the
correlation between arbitrators’ ideologies and their decision-making. Despite it is
possibly solving some of the concerns related to the systematic bias of the whole
arbitration system, such as abolishing the party appointment mechanism and
ensuring that the arbitrators are selected from a roster, it is far from addressing the
ideological bias of arbitrators. Further, it fails to address the problem of imbalance
between the sovereign state’s public interests and the private investors’ property
rights. Conversely, such a proposal would legitimize the ideological preferences
of arbitrators and centralize the illegitimacy issues in one body. Having said that,
the new proposal of establishing a multilateral investment court will carries the
flaws of the current ISDS system and constitutes a centralized powerful and
predisposed body that will continue to be negatively affecting the regulatory
sphere of host states.
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